WHAT THE SOLDIER THINKS

A Monthly Digest of War Department Studies on the Attitudes of American Troops

HOW'S YOUR CHOW? .......................... 1

ROTATION PROBLEMS OF MEN IN INACTIVE THEATERS .................. 3

MEN WANT POST-WAR TALKS ................. 5

SOLDIERS WANT EDUCATION ................ 7

RAISING THE MORALE OF COMBAT COMPANIES:
OFFICERS' OPINIONS ......................... 8

SERVICE TROOPS IN COMBAT ................. 12

THE LINE OFFICER AND THE MP'S .......... 14

HOW AAF MEN IN EUROPE VIEW FUTURE FIGHTING .......... 16

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE ACT, 50 U. S. C., 31 AND 32, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
WAR DEPARTMENT,

What the Soldier Thinks, Number 9, A Monthly Digest of War Department Studies on the Attitudes of American Troops, is published for the information and guidance of all concerned.

[A. O. O61.05 (3 Jan 44).]

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

G. C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

J. A. ULLIO,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

DISTRIBUTION:

O (5); B (2); R (2); C (21); Def cmd (5); Sv C (10); Air Sv C (20); AF (2); Sp Sv Sch, AGF (21);
Gen and Sp Sv Sch, AAF (2); Sp Sv Sch, ASF (5);
Post, Camps, Sta (1) Continental only; PE (Sp Sv Off) (50) except NY and SD PE (Sp Sv Off) (50).
How's Your Chow?

More men gripe about food preparation than about food quality

Source: Surveys of attitudes of troops in several overseas areas.

"The object of good mess management is to build and maintain an efficient, economical, and attractive mess. Nothing contributes more to the morale of an organization than the fulfillment of this mission."

THE OFFICER'S GUIDE

Gripes against the mess are heard in nearly every Army outfit. A few mild gripes are one thing, and a widespread sense of grievance is another. The latter can tear down morale in an otherwise satisfied unit.

Soldiers are much more likely to be critical of the preparation of food than of its quality. As the chart below shows, three-fifths of the men in one inactive overseas area think their food is poorly prepared, while only one-third of the men think their food is of poor quality.

The following chart shows how men in various installations in an overseas area (all of which receive practically the same ration) rate food preparation.

As one sergeant put it, "The only gripe on my part is Army chow, it is not at any time prepared right. While the Army prepares to buy the best kind of food when it eventually reaches you it is not fit to eat."

HOW MESS MANAGEMENT AFFECTS EATING HABITS

If, as the old saw goes, the proof of the pudding is in the eating, a detailed study conducted by QM actually puts mess practices to the acid test --
the test of checking on men's eating habits.

This study, made in a large number of mess halls using the same ration but operating under different rules, ignored men's comments and used only one measurement -- the amount of food wasted.

While this study revealed that preparation, quality and choice of foods were the most important factors in influencing men's eating habits, it also revealed a number of points about mess hall management that influenced the amount men ate. No one point listed below was very important by itself, but taken together, all the points add up to an important affect on the eating habits. They indicate that informality in mess halls is a food saver.

It was found that more food was wasted (i.e., less was eaten) if a formal rather than an informal atmosphere was maintained in the mess hall. For example:

More food was wasted if men had to wait outside the mess hall in line instead of entering and sitting down immediately.

More food was wasted if men ate on command instead of arrival.

More food was wasted if company announcements were made during meals.

More food was wasted if men were not permitted to smoke in mess halls.

The study also proved that if hot foods were allowed to stand long on the tables, wastage increased. Similarly, if the mess hall was understaffed, wastage increased.

HOW TO IMPROVE YOUR MESS

The following recommendations are offered to commanding officers by the Office of the Quartermaster General:

1. The commanding officer should take a personal interest in the mess. He should visit it often, especially to drop in for a meal unannounced. He should check physical conditions in the mess hall -- cleanliness, table arrangement, etc.

2. As far as is consistent with wishes of higher authority and good discipline, the commander should encourage the maintenance of an informal atmosphere in the mess hall.

3. If the mess sergeant and cooks have not been to cooks and bakers school recently, the commander should attempt to have them sent.

4. If a school is not available, the commander may write to the Office of the Quartermaster General in Washington for recipes and preparation hints prepared by famous chefs as aids to the Army cook.
ROTATION PROBLEMS OF MEN IN INACTIVE THEATERS

Complaints about rotation policies are most frequent among men with little sense of their mission

Source: Studies of cross sections of enlisted men in several overseas theaters of differing degrees of activity.

In the not very far off future, the Army is going to be increasingly concerned with a particularly intensified rotation problem. Some indication of the problem to be faced is found in a study of the attitudes of enlisted men serving overseas. It may be expected to be most serious among men garrisoning positions and serving in the Army of Occupation.

Once the war in Europe is won, there is danger men will lose the full sense of their important mission in the war effort. Studies among troops in inactive theaters show that a strong rela-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question: &quot;Do you consider your present job or duty in the Army an important one in the war effort?&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent of men saying...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Important; pretty Important</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not so Important; Not Important at all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas Area A (inactive defense zone)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas Area B (former combat zone; now relatively inactive)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas Area C (active combat zone)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percent of men saying rules are...</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Among men who say their jobs are...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Important in war effort</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not important in war effort</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3
tionship exists between men's sense of mission and their attitudes toward rotation. They also bring out clearly that men in inactive theaters (which have conditions comparable to the inactive conditions to be anticipated in Europe after Hitler's defeat) tend to have less sense of mission than men in active theaters. (See chart on preceding page.)

Even in an inactive theater marked differences are found among men with differing senses of mission in their attitudes toward the fairness of rotation and furlough rules.

Soldiers who have a high sense of mission (believe their jobs are important in the war or that their outfits are

### SENSE OF MISSION AND ATTITUDE TO ROTATION

The men were asked whether or not they thought there was still any need at this base for an outfit like theirs.

**Question:** Do you agree or disagree with this statement? "A man who has been overseas for 18 months has done his full share in the war and deserves to go home!"

Among men who say

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percent who say...</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>?</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>There is still need for their outfit</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is no longer need for their outfit</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Question:** Do you agree or disagree with the statement "There is no reason why the Army could not send all men home after 2 years overseas if it really would do it".

Among men who say

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percent who say...</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>?</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>There is still need for the outfit</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is no longer need for their outfit</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
needed in their theater) are less likely than men with a low sense of mission to rate present rotation policy as unfair. But it is obvious that to be able to pass intelligent judgment on the rotation policy, men must first know what that policy is.

UNDERSTANDING ROTATION POLICIES

Previous studies of attitudes toward rotation have brought out the fact that often men do not understand the rotation policy in their theater. When this lack of understanding is coupled with a lack of faith generally, it may lead to serious morale difficulties.

One enlisted man in an inactive zone put the matter this way:

"The uncertainty of things in general is bad for the morale of the men. In our organization, men who have been supposed to go back five months ago still have no idea when they will go back."

This sentiment was echoed by another soldier who said:

"I have heard a lot of different rumors about soldiers being sent back to the states. I have talked to some of the men at HQ of the post and they all agree that there is some regulation concerning the matter. What I can't see is, if there is something of that sort, why a soldier is not told all the latest changes. It would build up the morale of a soldier 100% because then he would have something to look forward to and not be misled by a lot of false rumors."

DEALING WITH THE PROBLEMS

Knowing the nature of two rotation problems discussed above, the commanding officer can do much now to cut down their seriousness. In attacking the problems the following two point approach should prove helpful:

1. He should do everything he can to convince his men of the importance of their mission, even though a phase of the war and their own combat in it may be over.

2. He should -- within the limits of his own level of information on the subject -- keep his men posted on his theater's rotation policy. Only through this method can he hope to hold down the circulation of "latrine rumors" and prevent a general feeling of unrest and confusion in his command.

MEN WANT POST-WAR TALKS

Soldiers are looking toward the future and they want discussions of problems ahead

Source: Surveys of the attitudes of troops in two overseas theaters and in continental U.S.

(Note: This report is preliminary to a detailed report on postwar orientation to be presented in a forthcoming issue.)

Long before the last battle is won, soldiers -- at the front and in the rear -- think of peace. "After victory -- what?" they want to know.

The answer to that question cannot be allowed to go begging. If wars are fought for any reason, they are fought for the rewards and the guarantees that come with victory and peace. GI's abroad and at home have been asking -- and are now asking -- about plans for returning soldiers, plans to establish a lasting peace, plans for jobs and security when they come back home.
What will happen "after the war" has always been a topic of interest and concern to many soldiers. This has been demonstrated in numerous research studies both in the United States and among men overseas.

As the war progresses, men's interest in the postwar world continues to be very intense. Two recent surveys among troops in an active and in a relatively inactive theater overseas reveal that postwar problems now hold highest rank among orientation topics of interest to enlisted men. In the active theater, 23 percent of the topics suggested for orientation talks were related to postwar. In the other theater, an even higher percentage of the suggestions were related to postwar.

**POSTWAR ORIENTATION**

In all realism, the time for the company officer to begin orienting his men for the cessation of fighting is now. The experience of the last war and the morale problems which accompanied the peace of 1918 points out that these problems can be every bit as serious as the morale problems of war. Anticipating them and preparing soldiers for them can go far to maintain a high morale even after the last shot is fired.

Orientation for postwar should have these two big objectives:

1. To maintain the morale of troops remaining in the Army for further duty.
2. To give to those who are to be demobilized an orientation that will aid them in becoming constructive citizens when they return to civilian life.

(It may be argued that premature emphasis on postwar matters takes men's minds off the big job ahead: winning the war. This argument may have been valid some months ago, but as the war in Europe approaches a victorious close, emphasis on postwar should not have this effect. Men's minds are naturally becoming more and more preoccupied with the postwar period and there is every reason to believe that postwar orientation now should strengthen rather than weaken their determination to get the job done.)

Many of them will want to know, too, what has been done to make the postwar world secure and safe for them and their families. Insofar as the company officer has such information he should give it to them now.

The process of demobilization is complicated. But it is being worked out in all fairness by the War Department. Fair as it is, it may make many soldiers unhappy. Much of that unhappiness can be anticipated and alleviated by giving men the straight goods about demobilization and how it will affect them now.
SOLDIERS WANT EDUCATION

Business and mechanical subjects are top favorites with enlisted men in an overseas theater.

Source: Survey of opinions of a large group of service troops and Air Force ground troops in an overseas theater.

More than three out of every five enlisted men studied say they are either "very much" or "pretty much" interested in taking educational courses in the Army while waiting demobilization after the enemy is defeated.

Only one soldier in every ten says he is "not interested at all" in taking such courses.

Interest in courses is closely related to the amount of education men already have. Among college men, three-quarters are "very much" or "pretty much" interested, while among men who did not finish grade school, only a third are so favorable to the idea.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COURSES MEN WANT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The men were asked to check those subjects they most wanted to study on a list of 26 courses which are among those the Army plans to offer in the post-hostilities, predemobilization period.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As the list below shows, most men checked courses closely related to the practical problems met on jobs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Course checked by 21-30% of the men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Business Principles and Management</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Courses checked by 11-20% of the men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Auto Mechanics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervision and Foremanship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue Print Reading</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salesmanship</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Courses checked by 6-10% of the men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Business Arithmetic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bookkeeping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning Your Post-War Career</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shop Mathematics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business Law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beginning Electricity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanical Drafting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carpentry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beginning Radio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Sciences</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Courses checked by 5% of the men or less</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Advertising</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Languages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Economic Problems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The American Way</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review Arithmetic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
RAISING THE MORALE OF COMBAT INFANTRY OFFICERS

Question: "Aside from a chance to return home, what in your opinion would help most to raise the morale in your company even higher than it may be now?"

SUGGESTION...

*Percentages add to more than 100 as some officers made more than one suggestion.*
COMPANIES: OFFICERS' OPINIONS

Pacific tell what they think would help most

Source: Study of company-grade line officers constituting a representative sample of officers in two divisions which fought in the Pacific.

Rest -- good food -- the cold "dope" about his outfit's operations -- the feeling that his work is appreciated and that his leaders are doing their best to get him the best -- these are factors which raise a combat soldier's morale. (See chart opposite.)

This statement is based on suggestions made by company-grade line officers from two Pacific combat divisions in response to the following question:

"Aside from a chance to return home, what in your opinion would help most to raise the morale in your company even higher than it may be now?"

This report is based on a selection of typical statements by officers -- in their own words -- of methods for raising an outfit's morale.

It should be noted that many of their suggestions concern improvements or changes in the military program that lie beyond the company officer's jurisdiction. In addition, of course, it should be recognized that often the combat leader operates under severe handicaps in trying to help his men get sufficient rest, better food, more information.

By and large, the combat officers recognize the above limitations. But most of them are agreed that, within the bounds of military necessity, the line officer should do everything in his power to get these services to his men.

1. ADEQUATE REST PERIODS

Rest is a subject that is constantly on the combat soldier's mind. Successful completion of the action in which he is engaged can pay several rewards -- not the least of which is a chance to relax, to forget the sounds and chaos of battle, if only for a while.

...at regular intervals

"Rest periods run on a regular schedule so the men have a definite rest period to look forward to."

"Definite rest periods after each year in the combat area or after each two campaigns."

...in a civilized country

"A good rest period where a man can make contacts again with civilized life ...When a man has been separated from any type of civilian contacts for a period of 12 months, he needs first such contacts to make him realize again just what he is fighting for."

...free from training and restriction

"The next time this outfit gets a break make it a real one, instead of trying to get some half-hearted training out of the men when they know they are supposed to be in a rear area."

"A real rest of at least six months in a civilized country. Two and a half months hardly compensates for 11 months in the Solomons and a year under the rigid restrictions of Hawaii."

"Long rest period in area where men can forget what they have been through and can enjoy themselves without training for a period."

"A longer rest period in a civilized country, instead of only three months. This is to be a rest period and not a
period of harassing the men by trying to follow a rigid drill schedule. In other words, rest when rest is earned and then work when rest period is over."

II. MORE AND BETTER CHOW AND LIVING FACILITIES

"Chow" -- served in the regular mess and supplemented by PX supplies -- has always ranked near the top of any list of subjects close to the GI's heart. Also important to the soldiers are such comfort-making facilities as movies, better housing, and radios.

Combat officers realize the difficulty involved in keeping troops supplied with desired quantities of fresh food and PX supplies, but, recognizing the beneficial morale effect good food has on their men, they rate "chow" as very important in raising an outfit's morale.

"Give the Infantry more entertainment such as one motion picture machine per Bn., beer at least once a week especially in combat... Provide men that have musical talent with instruments so the Bn SS officer could coordinate some musical entertainment..."

"Make PX supplies, particularly candy, soft drinks, and moderate rations of beer available to troops in combat zones wherever possible."

"Improved Post Exchange facilities -- emphasizing ice cream, coca cola, cold beer. Better ration balance. Spam, corned beef and vienna sausage plus dehydrated potatoes get very dull. Most of it goes into the dump no matter how hungry you are. We have excellent bakers but can't get the flour, yeast, lard and other ingredients. This is a simple way to a good mess. Fresh fruits wherever possible and fresh meats are needed."

III. MORE DEFINITE AND RELIABLE INFORMATION TO THE MEN

Previous research studies have shown how important it is in the building of morale to keep men informed. Ideally this information should include facts about present and future operations and the men's part in them, plus facts about policies and plans that will effect the men.

Most of the officers recommending the provision of such information hasten to qualify their statements, however. "As much information as possible" they say, recognizing the fact that often officers themselves do not have the complete dope.

...about rotation

"Well, a little more sincerity on the part of everyone concerned with issuing directives and orders... It does not pay to rise false hopes in a man of going home, then when things fall thru, morale drops. In other words, let us always deal in the cold facts and morale will go up."

"An understanding or definite idea to length of service they must spend overseas -- rather than going on indefinitely with nothing in view."

...about plans and operations

"To know as far as practicable and possible under the conditions, the future plans for the Division. Dates need not be given but general area for combat and approximate time of leaving rest area."

"I firmly believe that the six months time lag between operations with no information as to what to expect in the future was a great blow to morale of all men of the regiment."

...in general

"I think that the men should not be made promises that are to be broken. The men have been promised many things that didn't materialize. There may be a reason for such things. If so why aren't the men told that reason?"

IV. OTHER SUGGESTIONS

Other morale-raising suggestions made by 10 percent or less of the officers include suggestions for providing necessary training and equipment; giving AGF troops full credit for their share in
the war; getting better news from the home front; and cutting down the flow of non-com replacements so that combat veterans can get more ratings.

**...provision of necessary training and equipment**

Training programs overseas are often handicapped by lack of teaching aids and equipment. In addition, officers' comments suggest that at times men tend to get "fed up" with taking the same old training over and over again.

"To be completely equipped with individual and organizational equipment and receive sufficient training in the use of new equipment before being sent back into combat."

"Too much training for veteran soldiers on the same basic subjects makes them very poor in their spirit..."

"If aides to training were more readily available, the men would take a great deal more interest in it and they would get more out of it...How can we teach map reading, for example, without maps, aerial photographs, or even a black-board?"

"A more interesting training program. Don't rehash the old crap they got in basic training years back. They're willing to learn new things -- new weapons, gases or a better way to do their jobs, but announce you're having a class in military courtesy and the groans make you feel pretty cheap."

"A good comprehensive training program which has as its objective how to improve our fighting in actual combat. This program should always present the relationship of training to the actual fighting. Also included in the program, more emphasis should be placed on cultivating the spirit in the individual soldier -- you can train a perfectly disciplined soldier who will be worth nothing unless he has the spirit to stick through the toughest fighting."

**...a fair share of credit for Ground Forces**

A common complaint heard from Pacific combat veterans is that the Army does most of the work and the Marines get most of the credit. This feeling -- whether real or imagined -- cuts pretty deep among both officers and men.

"A little more publicity for the Infantry so that the men will know that their work is appreciated. From newspapers back home, one would be led to believe that the Marine Corps has done all the work down here."

"Publicize the work the men are doing particularly in their own home towns. If a man has been in the lines and done a good job, he may not rate a medal, but hell! he certainly rates a line in his home town paper."

**...better news from home**

Stories about strikes and civilian apathy at home tend to have a depressing effect on many combat soldiers. Another type of story which troubles men overseas is the "rotation rumor" story.

"Elimination of strikes, apathy etc. on home front in such a way the men will know that everyone back there is behind the war effort. Pictures such as the gay winter season in Miami are bad for morale out here."

**...increased promotional opportunities**

Now that a higher percentage of privates are being sent overseas as replacements, dissatisfaction with promotional opportunities among combat troops should not be nearly so widespread today as it was some time ago when many non-coms were being assigned to combat outfits. However, a minority of officers still single it out as a morale-lowering practice.

"Stop sending in green NCO's to fill vacancies created by casualties. Men who have combat experience can better fill the NCO vacancies and they have earned the promotions and their fellow soldiers have confidence in them. The present practice has a very bad effect on morale."
SERVICE TROOPS IN COMBAT

Divisional service troops' morale compares favorably with that of AGF troops—but with some differences

Source: Study of enlisted men in a division which has seen combat in the Pacific.

Service troops in Infantry divisions are combat troops in the full sense of the word. Though they seldom fire at the enemy, they get their taste of enemy fire -- their jobs taking them to the front lines. In moving supplies to the men on the line, they learn the fury of the enemy's strafing and bombing.

It is not surprising then that, in general, the morale attitudes of divisional service troops are similar to those of other divisional troops alongside whom they work and fight. There are, however, some notable exceptions to this rule. One of these exceptions is in the area of job satisfaction.

JOB ATTITUDES OF SERVICE TROOPS

A study of service troops of a veteran division from the Pacific reveals that they are less likely to want to change their Army jobs than are other troops in the same division.

As asked, "How satisfied are you about being in your present Army job instead of some other Army job?" the men in the division answer as follows:

54% of the service troops say they are "satisfied" or "very satisfied" with their jobs.

42% of the other troops in the division say they are "satisfied" "very satisfied" with their jobs.

This tendency toward greater job satisfaction among service troops holds in spite of the fact that they tend to be less optimistic about promotion chances than do the other troops in the division.

57% of the service troops say they think a soldier with ability has a good chance for promotion in the Army. This compares with:

65% of the other divisional troops who say the same.

Probably a whole complex of reasons accounts for the greater prevalence of job satisfaction among service troops. For one thing, service troops more often hold Army assignments which call for the utilization of special skills.

RATING THE COMBAT JOB OF SERVICE TROOPS

Service troops exist to service the troops who are in the line to meet and destroy the enemy. The effectiveness of the fighting troops depends in large measure on the ability of service troops to keep supplies moving up to the front, to clear the way for advances, to care for the wounded, to impede the enemy.

In the division studied, the Infantry regiments and Artillery battalions were asked the following question:

"While you were in combat, did you feel that the troops to the rear, in general, were doing as much as they could under the circumstances for the men who were doing the fighting?"

Over-all, these fighting troops say that men in the service outfits did as much as they could under the circumstances to help them in combat. The distribution of their answers is shown in the chart at the top of the next page.
HOW DID TROOPS TO THE REAR DO IN COMBAT

Percent of Infantry and Artillery men saying...

...As much as they could 60%
...Could have done somewhat more 20%
...Could have done a great deal more 17%
...No answer 3%

RATING THE COMBAT JOB OF FOUR SERVICE BRANCHES

About one-third of the service troops in the sample studied were in the Engineers. Twenty-eight percent were Medical Corps men, followed in order by Signal Corps, Quartermaster Corps, and a sprinkling of Chemical Warfare and Transportation Corps men.

These men and the men in the division's Infantry regiments and Artillery battalions were asked to rate the job being done in combat by four branches of service troops.

By and large, service troops tend to rate their own combat performance highly. While Infantry and Artillery troops are also complimentary in their ratings of service branches in combat, they tend to think far more highly of some outfits than of others.

This tendency is reflected in the fact that they rate the combat job done by the Engineers and the Medical Corps highest of all and give their lowest ratings to Quartermaster and Ordnance troops.

Even among the service troops, this tendency is apparent. In the case of the latter, however, the Engineers and Medical Corps men who made up the biggest portion of the men sampled tended to over-weight the result in their favor.

Teamwork in Combat

The above facts about attitudes toward the job divisional service troops are doing in combat presents a problem that is well worth the infantry or artillery officer's consideration.

Studies have shown the importance of teamwork in combat. Troops to the rear and troops to the front must work as a well-oiled machine if the mission of all is to be accomplished with highest efficiency. The line officer who devotes some time to impressing on his men the fact that every man -- whether he fires a rifle or pounds a typewriter -- is doing an important job in the division will be making a real contribution to smoothing the teamwork of his outfit.
THE LINE OFFICER AND THE MP'S

There is much the line officer can do to smooth relations between his men and the MP's.

Source: Study of a cross section of enlisted men and all available company-grade officers in the Corps of Military Police in continental U.S.; additional data from a study of a cross section of enlisted men in an inactive theater overseas and in the U.S.

Because of the fact that soldiers overseas are in close contact with strange people and strange customs, new conduct restrictions -- enforced by MP's -- are often placed on them. Every new restriction, every new order which MP's must enforce, brings them into contact with more and more men. It is essential that the line officer -- particularly the officer overseas -- do everything in his power to smooth relations between his men and the MP's.

A study of men's attitudes toward MP's in an overseas inactive but still on the alert theater suggests how the MP problem tends to become even more intense in foreign countries. It also provides a preview of what may well be the case in other theaters when deactivation comes.

The study reveals that the proportion of men who do not feel that MP's treat them fairly varies considerably in different areas in the theater. This suggests that variations in administration of theater regulations by the company-grade MP officer may at least account in part for the attitudes of those enlisted men who feel MP's don't treat them fairly.

THE MP TELLS HIS STORY...

When the typical MP states his case -- his concept of the factors that affect his problem of adjustment to the Army and to officers and men in other branches -- it runs along the lines charted on the following page. Contrary to what many other officers and men may think, the MP has high pride in his outfit and is usually "sold" on the importance of his assignment and mission.

A study of a cross section of troops in the U.S. on the relative popularity of various Army branches demonstrates the need for orientation aimed at improving the relations between MP's and other soldiers. The study showed that the MP's are not just feeling sorry for themselves when they complain of their lack of popularity but are, in fact, merely stating the case. In the study, "the MP branch" was chosen by soldiers generally as:

The branch they like the least
The branch which gives its soldiers the least amount of work to do
The branch which has the least dangerous jobs
The branch which will be least important in winning the war.

The line officer knows these facts from experience. He knows, too, that the maintenance of order and discipline in any army demands that those in charge of maintaining order be respected.

WHAT THE LINE OFFICER CAN DO WHEN HIS JOB CALLS FOR IT

It is reasonable to suppose that the line officer can do much to alleviate the MP "problem" by seeing to it that his men get the truth about MP's. Such a program of orientation might well include the following information:
The following statements have been made by various people about the Military Police. Do you agree or disagree with them?

(a) "Most soldiers do not like the MP's."

(b) "MP's like to help soldiers who are in trouble."

(c) "The MP's have a bad reputation."

(d) "The MP's are the best disciplined soldiers in the Army."

(e) "It doesn't take as much training to make a good MP as it does to make a man a good soldier in other branches of the service."

(f) "The MP's like to show off their authority."

(g) "Being an MP is a soft job."

--- Information about the fact that MP's are the equals of their soldiers in AGCT scores and education.

--- Information about the accomplishments of MP's in combat and at home.

--- Information about the rigid, professional training given MP's.

--- Information explaining clearly the authority vested in MP's and encouraging men's recognition of and obedience to this authority.

Finally, the line officer should be careful to back up the MP whenever his own men are at fault.
HOW AAF MEN IN EUROPE VIEW FUTURE FIGHTING

They expect to serve against the Japs and are willing to go—but they want furloughs first

Source: Survey of flying and ground personnel in an Air Force fighting the Germans.

Our air war veterans of the European front are realistic in their appraisal of what will lie ahead of them when the European phase of the present global war is over.

A recent study in one theater, made during a period of intense and costly action in the air, shows that a majority of Air Forces men in the theater recognize the need for their services in the Pacific after the defeat of Germany and express their willingness to accept such service. It should be noted, however, that the data presented here are for AAF personnel only and may not be representative of troops in AGF and ASF.

MOST AAF MEN WANT FURLOUGHS FIRST

There is a strong desire on the part of most Air Forces men for a furlough in the States before shipment to another theater. This desire is coupled with a fairly common belief that, even though they will be needed in the fight against Japan, it will not be necessary for them to be shipped to the Pacific immediately.

There is, of course, a strong connection between the opinion men hold of the necessity of their going to the Pacific and their degree of willingness to go.

There is also a definite connection between men's ideas of the toughness of air fighting in the Pacific and their willingness to go. The tougher they think Pacific fighting will be, the more willing they are likely to be to get into that fight.

It is significant that over-all only 11 percent of the flying personnel and 13 percent of the ground personnel say they would not want to go at all to the Pacific to fight after Hitler is defeated in Europe.

A PROGRAM OF EDUCATION

As indicated in the chart presented above, there is a sizeable minority among the Air Force personnel who either don't know that they will be needed to fight the Japs or feel they will not be needed. Orientation designed to show these men that they will be needed and just why they will be needed should go far to set them straight.
HOW THE STUDIES ARE MADE

The articles in this bulletin are based on attitude surveys conducted by the Research Branch, Morale Services Division and the research units reporting to the commanding generals of the several theaters.

The staff of the Research Branch is composed of Army officers who are experienced in the field of surveys, together with a number of civilian specialists. Techniques have been developed, tested and adjusted to fit the Army's problems.

The basic steps in conducting a study are as follows:

1. The questionnaire is prepared in consultation with the War Department branches, or the theater command immediately concerned. Questions are carefully chosen to provide the exact type of information desired.

2. The questionnaire is pre-tested. That is, the questions are tried out on small groups of men to determine whether they are meaningful and understandable to the type of men or officers to be studied.

3. The project is cleared for action with the commands in which the study is to be made.

4. The number of men to be surveyed is set sufficiently large to insure statistically reliable findings.

5. The men to be surveyed are selected to insure as true a cross section of the group to be studied as possible. A cross section of enlisted men in the United States, for example, is so drawn as to give proper proportionate representation to each branch of the Army, to men in each stage of training, and to men stationed in the various sections of the country. It is, of course, possible to get cross sections of a single branch, of a division, of Negro troops, or any other portion of the Army desired.

6. The men complete questionnaires under conditions of absolute anonymity. They are assembled in small groups, and hear a short introduction given by a specially trained class leader. This introduction makes it clear to the men that only their frank opinion is wanted, and that they are not being tested or spied on. If the group is composed of enlisted men, the class leader is an enlisted man, and no officers are present during the session. No names or serial numbers are placed on the questionnaires. Ordinarily, illiterates or men of very low intelligence are interviewed by specially trained enlisted men.

7. The data are analyzed by specialists in attitude research analysis. Reports of these analysts are released to agencies concerned, and also form the basis for the material presented in this bulletin.

The procedure outlined above is that followed in the typical cross section survey. Other techniques, of course, are employed from time to time in special situations.