WHAT THE SOLDIER THINKS
A Monthly Digest of War Department Studies on the Attitudes of American Troops

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WAR DEPARTMENT,

What the Soldier Thinks, Number 7, A Monthly Digest of War Department Studies on the Attitudes of American Troops, is published for the information and guidance of all concerned.

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G. C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:
J. A. Ulio,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

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"IF I WERE THE C O..."
Combat veteran enlisted men tell what they would do to improve their outfits if they were company commanders

Source: Study of a cross section of enlisted men of an Infantry division which fought in the Mediterranean area.

Suppose the average GI were pulled out of the line and given a chance to change places with his company commander. Suppose he were given carte blanche--told to write his own ticket as far as the outfit were concerned, given authority to institute any changes he pleased to improve his command. What would he do?

To get insight into the command problems which were affecting the morale of combat soldiers, the issue was put to a cross section of infantrymen and artillerymen from a division which saw hard combat in the Mediterranean theater. The men were asked the following two-part question:

"If you were a company commander in combat and had been given authority to do anything you felt would make your company better in working together and doing its job--

"a. What are some of the things you would do to get more whole-hearted cooperation from the men?"

"b. What are some of the things you would make sure to do in looking after the welfare of your men?"

GETTING WHOLEHEARTED COOPERATION FROM THE MEN

Most of the men questioned had something to say in answer to both parts of the question. While no attempt has been made to list their suggestions by percentages, they are catalogued in this report roughly in order of the frequency with which they occurred. Examples given under each category are taken from the questionnaires in the men's own words.

The suggestions made by the men are not offered as conclusive evidence of what company commanders should do for their men. Some of the suggestions are based on typical enlisted men gripes. Others are simply not practical in the light of company commanders' over-all job.

I. I would be democratic; I would be a buddy to my men.

By far the most frequently mentioned suggestion for getting "more whole-hearted cooperation from the men" is the one paraphrased above. Those mentioning it contend that men resent being "pushed around" by officers, that they will do their best for the C.O. who mingles with them and treats them as a "comrade in arms."

The following excerpts from men's statements are typical:

"...be regular with men, personally ask them their troubles. A regular officer gets more out of his men."

"I would live much closer to them. Too many company commanders do not mingle with their men enough."

"I would act like a human being & that would remedy everything."

"...Stop and pass the time of day occasionally. Make them know you a regular guy which also proves that you have more respect for them."

(NOTE: This matter of having "respect" for the men is of considerable importance in men's thinking. See the
quotations under category II immediately following.)

"Be a regular guy with the boys. If the boys like their leader, they'll go through hell for him."

II. I'd treat them like men.

Men resent being treated as "manpower" in the abstract. They want to retain their essential dignity, their identity as human beings. While they ask no more than equal, fair treatment, they are bitter about anything less than that.

"Treat them like men."

"Be a little more cooperative with the men; treat them more as men than a bunch of pawns."

"Treat them as men, not serial numbers, treat them as individuals not as a herd of cattle."

"...treat them as men both in and out of combat."

"Treat them as men not dogs."

III. I'd give them more off-duty time, rest, recreation, passes.

"More freedom" embodies the ideas expressed in many of the men's suggestions. The suggestion is often accompanied by another request: once that freedom is granted, don't violate it.

"More rest and recreation."

"Give them more time off when possible and I know I would get more out of them when the time comes."

"Let them rest when it came their time to and not drill them God damn it they know what they have to do and they do it to."

"I wouldn't keep harassing them. I wouldn't be to G.I. I'd give them a break on passes whenever I had a chance."

"Never harass them during the time they are supposed to have for themselves."

IV. I'd ask their opinions and give them a share in policy.

Men's sense of self-respect is not limited to their feeling of equality with officers as human beings. Combat soldiers often feel that they have something to offer to their C.O. which will benefit company operations. They have ideas and suggestions which they feel will improve the outfit, and they insist that if their C.O. really wants to find out their problems he had better come to them.

"Ask suggestions from the men and if possible fulfill them."

"Take them more into my confidence upon the tasks of the company."

"Ask the men their opinions on some of the problems."

"Accept more suggestions from the men. Officers seldom listen to better and quicker ways of doing things; and after a while a man gets discouraged."

"First thing I would do is listen to what they had to say and get ideas from them and then see what could be done."

"Look at their side of things once in a while."

V. I'd share their hardships and dangers. I'd get up there with them.

Men's ideas about combat leadership tend to revolve about this concept: The way to lead is to get up there with the men. They respect the officer who shares their hardships, who asks no special privileges but goes through anything he asks his men to go through.

"...above all, 'get up there' when the going is tough."

"...lead the company at the front and really stay where they could see you not hide..."

"I would try to show myself a leader by being with the men not laying in a fox hole behind them."

"Be as close to the men as possible. Let them know that you are there enduring the same things."

"I would not let men see me getting any privilege that they couldn't have at the time."

"To work with the men together. And not make them do anything you wouldn't do yourself."
VI. I'd tell them the score, give them the 'big picture'.

Orientation is important, because men are more likely to cooperate wholeheartedly if they understand the nature of the job ahead.

"...if possible, giving them the 'big picture'..."

"Stop kidding them and give them the goods straight."

"Show them the true facts."

"...before going into combat explain exactly what is to take place in detail."

"Take them into confidence and try to explain what the situation was and have each man know his job and what was to be expected of them."

"Be more frank with the men by telling them what their next mission will be, why they are doing it, and when it's over, just what they accomplished."

Other suggestions

While the above categories include a vast majority of the suggestions made, a substantial minority of the men made suggestions which fall roughly under the following headings:

1. I'd treat all my enlisted men alike and not show partiality.

2. I'd recognize and reward men's abilities.

3. I'd improve job assignments in the company; right man for the right job.

4. I'd go to bat for my men.

5. I wouldn't be too G.I.

LOOKING AFTER MEN'S WELFARE

When men think of "welfare" they think in terms of the comforts that make life in and out of combat more pleasant. They think of hot food, protective clothing, frequent rest periods, off-duty time, clean water to wash in. These are the little things that are so important to men whose jobs involve lack of comfort and much hardship.

1. I'd supply them with the best food possible.

Almost half the men answering the question on what they would do in looking after the welfare of their men mentioned food. Some would make sure their men got hot food; others specify better food. "Chow" is important. The following comments tell the story:

"See they were comfortable and had the best of chow—that means everything to them."

"Try to get the best food possible."

"Be with the men more—see how they eat, how they have to sleep, how hard they actually work. Officers should go through mess lines with men."

"Chow and see they got plenty."

"Keep after the supply and mess sergeants."

II. I'd supply them with the best clothing and equipment.

Clothing and equipment rank second only to "chow" in men's suggestions for looking after their welfare.

"...see that they got the best clothing and equipment available."

"Get them extra socks."

"Clothes, cigarettes and mail are all a soldier worries about."

III. I'd get them "all the comforts" I possibly could.

Welfare means "all the comforts" to many GI's. This idea is often paraphrased as "Give a man every break you can. See that he's taken care of."

"Take good care of them, also look out for them, treat them as if they were your buddies."

"All the comforts, fix up their places of sleep and areas as they see fit, allow them the freedom & exhaltation of a man who finds he still lives."
"...to see that the men were first in every-
thing."

IV. I'd give them plenty of rest and
recreation.

To the combat soldier, rest is of
paramount importance.

"...when in a rest camp, let them rest and
not take them on hikes and listening to
classes all day."

"Give them a break on passes whenever pos-
sible. Get them good entertainment."

V. I'd treat them as men and stick up
for them.

This is the same idea already noted
in connection with men's suggestions for
getting cooperation from their men.

"Stick up for men all the way, help them when
they are wrong. Be one of them."

"A little less inspecting. They are men and
do have a little self respect."

"I would make sure I was commanding an Army
camp and not a prison camp. This is happen-
ing every day in the American Army."

"Treat them as fellow soldiers and have chats
with them. I personally hate that superior
feeling that some people have."

Other suggestions

The following areas of welfare im-
provement were mentioned by significant
percentages of the men:

1. Cleanliness
2. "Smokes"
3. Understanding and sympathizing
with men's problems.
4. Relaxing military restrictions to
give men more freedom and cut their work
load.
5. Better mail service.

SOME ATTITUDES OF PUERTO RICAN GI'S

Our insular soldiers want to learn English, prefer
American movies with Spanish sub-titles, and have
ideas about their Army mess

Source: Study of a cross section of Puerto Rican
troops in the Panama Canal Department.

Large numbers of Puerto Rican soldiers
are stationed in the Panama Canal De-
partment. To find out what these In-
sular GI's think, a special Spanish-
language questionnaire was administered
to a cross section of Puerto Rican
"Yanks."

Perhaps one of the most interesting
characteristics of the Puerto Rican sol-
dier is his desire to learn English.
Fully 80 percent of the men questioned
say they "would be very interested" in
studying English as part of their regu-
lar training. Forty percent say they
would enroll for English evening classes
two nights a week.

Another interesting finding of the
study is the fact that most Puerto Rican
soldiers prefer American movies with
Spanish sub-titles to any other kind.
Sixty-four percent say they prefer
Hollywood productions (with Spanish sub-
titles), 20 percent prefer Mexican pic-
tures, 9 percent American pictures
without sub-titles, and 7 percent Argen-
tinean pictures.

One problem that concerns many Puerto
Rican enlisted men has to do with food.
Their tastes in cooking are often left
unsatisfied by ordinary GI mess. They
want more rice and dried beans and less
potatoes and other vegetables. Also
they would like to see the food prepared
Puerto Rican style by cooks who under-
stand Puerto Rican cookery.
ATTITUDES TOWARD SILVER STAR AWARDS

Most combat officers and men are satisfied with the way Silver Star gallantry awards have been made.

Source: Study of representative cross sections of combat veteran company-grade officers and enlisted men in 5 Infantry divisions (3 from the Pacific; 2 from the Mediterranean).

The officer who has commanded troops --whether in training or in combat--appreciates the morale importance of medals and awards. These pieces of ribbon and metal are the mark of a job well done, of gallantry, of service in and beyond the line of duty.

One of the most treasured medals awarded to combat troops is the Silver Star for gallantry in action. It is a medal commonly awarded to ground force enlisted men for heroism yet is granted sparingly enough to call attention to its wearer as a hero.

Study of the attitudes of thousands of officers and enlisted men in 5 combat divisions reveals that, in general, most combat veterans are satisfied with the way Silver Stars have been awarded. However, fairly large minorities among both officers and men indicate some dissatisfaction.

Because the maximum morale effect from special awards like the Silver Star can be achieved only if the awards are meted out with extreme care, it is essential that all cases considered for awards should be investigated very closely. The officer who is in position to recommend an enlisted man for an award should ask himself two questions:

1. Is this particular man deserving?
2. Am I overlooking some one equally or more deserving?

WHAT VETERAN OFFICERS AND EM FROM TWO FRONTS THINK OF SILVER STAR AWARDS

QUESTIONS: "How do you feel about the way the Silver Star is awarded to enlisted men?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERCENT OF OFFICERS AND EM SAYING...</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>OFFICERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All enlisted men I know who got them really deserved them.</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A few men I know who got them did not deserve them.</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Many men I know who got them did not deserve them.</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer.</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

QUESTIONS: "Do you know any enlisted men who deserved Silver Stars but did not get them?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERCENT OF OFFICERS AND EM SAYING...</th>
<th>EM</th>
<th>OFFICERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NOBODY</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A FEW.</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MANY.</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO ANSWER.</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Question: "While you were at the battlefront, did your leaders explain enough the combat mission of your squad to you so that you knew just what you personally had to do?" *

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERCENTAGE OF MEN IN EACH COMPANY ANSWERING &quot;YES.&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

"In all phases of administration, training and combat, it is important to keep your men informed. Nothing important should be left in the dark regarding the reason why they are doing what they are doing."

Source: Study of battle veteran enlisted men in 33 rifle companies sampled from 3 Pacific divisions.

Soldiers want to know "why" they do not want to operate in a vacuum. The ordinary soldier does his job better if he knows why he is doing that job. The teamwork of any squad or company is likely to be smoother, better, more efficient if the men are informed just what their combat or training mission is and just how what they do will contribute to the success of the over-all operation.

There is a striking relationship between men's feeling that they were informed about their combat mission and the way they rate the teamwork of their company in actual battle.

Among men who rate their company's battle teamwork as very good:

59% say their leaders "explained as much as they could" about the combat mission of their squad.

56% say their leaders "explained as much as they could" about how their company's part fitted into the campaign as a whole.

Among men who rate their company's battle teamwork as not good:

24% say their leaders "explained as much as they could" about the combat mission of their squad.

*Data based on responses of men in 33 rifle companies fighting the Japanese.
When men are told why they are doing what they are doing it is likely to pay off in better performance.

...and operation make every effort to states American soldiers so much as to for things."

Basic Field Manual 21-50 p. 29

23% say their leaders "explained as much as they could" about how their company's part fitted into the campaign as a whole.

Officers well know the difficulties which stand in the way of their desire to keep their men informed. Military security often prevents their doing so in battle. Another reason is simply that often officers themselves are not sufficiently informed by their own leaders.

Of a sample of Infantry officers from the same 3 Pacific combat divisions, 37 percent indicate that their own leaders could have explained more about their outfit's mission when they were in combat.

While the difficulties blocking officers' attempts to give their men the complete "dope" are formidable, a glance at the charts at the right and left reveal that in many outfits officers could explain a good deal more to their men. The companies charted have had more or less similar battle experiences. Yet wide variations are evident between companies on men's satisfaction that their leaders did their best to tell them the battle score.

Certainly no officer should be content unless and until he has given his men all the information he possibly can before and after assigning them their missions.

*Data based on responses of men in 33 rifle companies fighting the Japanese.
HATRED OF THE ENEMY

How powerful a battle motive is hatred of the enemy? How much does vindictiveness help the GI in the line when he has to call on that extra reserve of motivation to get through?

Surveys of attitudes of thousands of combat veterans who have met the Axis enemy on the battlefields of the world lead to the following conclusions:

1. A substantial minority of combat soldiers feel that hatred of the enemy helps them a lot when the going gets tough. However most soldiers are not especially vindictive and say that they are not helped a lot by thoughts of hatred of the enemy.

2. Vindictiveness against the Japs is greater than vindictiveness against the Germans. This is true among American soldiers everywhere.

3. Contact with enemy soldiers does not seem to increase vindictiveness:
   (a) Those men in the Pacific actually fighting the Japs tend to show less hatred for them than do the men in Europe who have never fought Japs.
   (b) Those actually fighting Germans in Europe tend to show little or no more hatred for them than do the men in the Pacific who have never fought Germans.

4. Most American soldiers -- whether in the Pacific or in Europe -- do not tell and have not heard stories of atrocities attributed to the enemy. Because of this

SOME OF THE DATA ON W

QUESTION: "When the going was tough, how much were you helped by thoughts of hatred of the enemy?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERCENTAGE SAYING...</th>
<th>INF. IN EUROPE</th>
<th>INF. IN PACIFIC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A lot</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little or none</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Had no such thoughts</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

QUESTION: "What would you like to see happen to Germany after the war?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERCENTAGE SAYING...</th>
<th>INF. IN EUROPE</th>
<th>INF. IN PACIFIC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Punish the leaders but not the ordinary Germans</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Make the German people suffer plenty</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wipe out the whole German nation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
An examination of vindicativeness as a motivation in combat

it is likely that propaganda descriptions of the enemy soldier which do not square with the GI's own impression will boomerang.

5. Very few men who have fought either the Germans or the Japs report seeing the enemy commit atrocities. So-called "eye witness" reports of atrocities are also fairly rare.

The men were asked: "How about atrocities? Did you personally ever see with your own eyes a case of the enemy using methods of fighting or treating prisoners which you would call dirty or unhuman?"

Only 13 percent of the veterans of Europe fighting and 13 percent of the veterans of the Pacific fighting report ever seeing such cases "with their own eyes."

Asked if they had heard stories from others concerning such atrocities, 24 percent of the European veterans and 45 percent of the Pacific veterans report having heard such stories. Some of the stories they relate are gruesome and it seems likely that the men relating them believe them. However, there is reason to doubt whether combat troops would believe such atrocity stories if they were not told by other combat troops.

6. Many soldiers who lack vindictiveness are probably standing on the shaky ground of too much identification with the enemy as a human being. In dealing with such men, a "hate campaign" probably would be particularly ineffective. These men need to be convinced that America's very survival depends upon killing the enemy with cold, impersonal determination, that the enemy must be destroyed if America is to live.

接触与敌人

QUESTION: "What would you like to see happen to the Japanese after the war?"

PERCENTAGE SAYING...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Punish the leaders but not the ordinary Japanese</th>
<th>INF. IN EUROPE</th>
<th>INF. IN PACIFIC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Make the Japanese people suffer plenty</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Even out the whole Japanese nation</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Contact with enemy prisoners of war has a varying effect on infantry-men. More than twice as many infantry-men from the Pacific as from Europe say that contact with enemy prisoners made them feel "all the more like killing them." Conversely, more than twice as many infantry-men from Europe as from the Pacific say that contact with enemy prisoners made them feel that it was "too bad we have to be fighting them."

Many others simply say that seeing enemy prisoners didn't effect them one way or the other.
ATTITUDES TOWARD NEWS IN CBI

China-Burma-India Yanks, thousands of miles from home, think highly of the Army News Service

Source: Studies of cross sections of enlisted men in the China-Burma-India theater and in continental U.S.

American soldiers in the China-Burma-India theater are literally half-way across the world from the U.S. In terms of distance -- and accessibility -- they are farther removed from the states than any of our troops. Often, too, they are isolated at lonely outposts, out of touch even with much of the world around them. Their closest contact with the world is through news reports, written and broadcast.

It is no wonder then that GI's in CBI are news hungry and that it is important to them to have their news hunger satisfied. Some CBI enlisted men who are stationed in large cities, can get much of their news from newspapers. But those men stationed at distant outposts and installations count heavily on the Army's News Service to keep them informed.

That the Army is doing a good job in getting the news to the men in CBI is evident when fully 71 percent of the soldiers there say that they have read or heard war news summaries prepared by the Morale Services Division of the Army especially for them.

The men themselves seem to appreciate the Army's efforts in getting the news to their outposts and stations. Three-fifths of the men say that the Army is doing a good job on keeping them up-to-date on the news.

THE NEWS MEN WANT

The more out of touch with the world a soldier gets, the more interested in news he is likely to become. This is especially true of news of the home front.

As asked if they found themselves becoming more or less interested in news of the home and fighting fronts the longer they were in the Army, the men replied as follows:

65% said "I get more and more interested in news of the home front."

54% said "I get more and more interested in news of the fighting fronts."

The percentage saying their interest in news of the fighting fronts increases with length of service is substantially the same as that found among a cross section of continental U.S. troops. However, 12 percent more of the men in CBI express increasing interest in news of the home front than among a U.S. cross section (65 percent as against 53 percent).

HOW NEWS SUMMARIES HELP

War news summaries prepared by the Army especially for the men in CBI seem to help these men substantially in their efforts to keep abreast of the news. An overwhelming majority of the men hearing or reading such summaries find them helpful.

QUESTION: "How much help are these war news summaries to you, in keeping up with the war news?"

PERCENT OF MEN SAYING...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THEY HELP A LOT</th>
<th>THEY HELP SOMEWHAT</th>
<th>THEY HARDLY HELP AT ALL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>60%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Cynicism about the News**

While men in CBI tend to be enthusiastic about news service in their theater, a substantial minority among them seem to exercise the old American prerogative of taking the news with a touch of cynicism.

**QUESTION:** "Do you think the war news sent out by the Army makes things look better than they really are, worse than they really are, or about the same as they really are?"

**PERCENT OF MEN SAYING...**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>...Better</th>
<th>...Worse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>39%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5%</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>...About the Same</th>
<th>...Undecided and No Answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>35%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cynicism about the Army's news service among men in CBI is not nearly so widespread as cynicism about news service (most of which is commercial news) among men in the U.S., however. Of the latter, fully 62 percent say they think the news of the war makes things "look better than they really are."

Despite this expressed cynicism about the news, there seems little doubt that the Army's program of getting news to men overseas is a real service to the troops. One of the fundamental truths of command is this: An informed soldier is a better soldier.

CBI enlisted men echo that thought when nine out of ten of them indicate that it is important to them personally "to have a clear understanding of why we are fighting this war." Part of the job of informing men about why the war is being fought is inseparably linked with the job of informing them about how it is being fought.

**WHAT YANKS IN CBI THINK OF THE CHINESE**

Most American soldiers having contact with our Chinese allies seem to admire and respect them.

CBI soldiers are the only Yanks in position to work closely with the Chinese soldiers and civilians. The Chinese may be a mystery to most Americans back home, but to GI's in China and North Burma they are real people sharing common hardships and fighting the same enemy.

Over-all, enlisted men in CBI think highly of the Chinese soldiers and the job they are doing in the war. They rate them fairly high as fighters; they express confidence in their nation's post-war friendship with the U.S.

Most striking among their attitudes toward the Chinese is their high rating of the Chinese war effort generally.

Fully 86 percent of them agree with the statement: "The Chinese are doing as good a job as possible of fighting the war, considering everything."

On the question of whether or not China can be depended upon to cooperate with the U.S. after the war, two-thirds of the men say that China "will cooperate." Only 4 percent say China "will not cooperate," while the rest say they "don't know."

In rating the Chinese as fighters, the men are somewhat more conservative in their judgment. Almost half rate them either "very good" or "good"; 30 percent rate them "fair," and only one man in 16 rates them "poor."
JOB TURNOVER AND MORALE ATTITUDES

Job shifting is related to men's attitudes toward their work, their promotional opportunities, and their officers.

Source: Study of a cross section of enlisted men in one ASF branch in continental U.S.

The specific Army job a soldier does is of tremendous importance in shaping his outlook on Army life. The soldier who is unhappy on the job is likely to be dissatisfied generally. Moreover his lack of job satisfaction may have a bad effect on the quality of work he does.

A recent study of enlisted men in one ASF branch reveals that one factor related to job morale is turnover. Shifting from job to job tends to lower men's attitudes in the following morale areas:

1. Over-all job satisfaction
2. Satisfaction with promotional opportunities
3. Confidence in officers

The charts below indicate how men's satisfaction with their jobs and with their own promotional opportunities tends to go down when they are shifted from job to job. The following finding shows how the same trend operates in relation to men's confidence in their officers:

Among men who have held the same job for the last six months, 36 percent express high confidence in their officers. This compares with 20 percent expressing high confidence among men who have held four or more jobs in that period.

While a certain amount of job shifting is unavoidable -- especially in the early days of an outfit's activation -- it is apparent that this turnover should be held to a minimum wherever possible. (The "no shifting" rule should be waived, of course, where men are badly assigned to begin with and an opportunity arises to shift them to more appropriate jobs.)

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JOB TURNOVER AND JOB SATISFACTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUMBER OF JOBS HELD IN LAST SIX MONTHS</th>
<th>Degree of job satisfaction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ONE</td>
<td><strong>HIGH</strong> 36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TWO OR THREE</td>
<td><strong>HIGH</strong> 24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOUR OR MORE</td>
<td><strong>HIGH</strong> 19%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JOB TURNOVER AND SATISFACTION WITH PROMOTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NUMBER OF JOBS HELD IN LAST SIX MONTHS</th>
<th>Degree of satisfaction with promotional opportunities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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</tbody>
</table>
THE TRAINING OF ARTILLERY REPLACEMENTS

The ideal replacement is the artilleryman who is a combination specialist and jack of all trades.

Source: Study of a cross section of enlisted artillerymen and all available company-grade Artillery officers in two Pacific combat divisions.

The training of battle replacements is of critical importance. The replacement often is thrown into the line as soon as he checks in. He is there to replace a fighting soldier. If the training he brings with him is inadequate, his new outfit must simply suffer the consequences. It is too late to do anything about the matter then.

The difficulties involved in supplying replacements so trained as to work out ideally in their new outfits are, of course, very great. It should also be noted that many of the officers quoted below have been overseas so long that they are not familiar with present training programs in the United States. Nevertheless, much of what they say should prove useful in improving the training of replacements.

In such a branch as the Field Artillery, for example, there seems to be an urgent need for replacements trained in the specific skills of the branch. "Greenhorn" replacements put a strain on the outfit. In many cases, their officers can only put them to work in combat and hope that they learn their necessary skills the hard way—under fire.

Artillery officers and enlisted men in two veteran divisions from the Pacific were asked: "Is there any type of training you think new troops should be getting before being sent into your outfit as replacements?"

Their answers do not follow any well-defined pattern. They are often contradictory. But they are well worth every Artillery officer's careful consideration because they are based on combat experience.

PERCENTAGE OF ARTILLERY OFFICERS AND MEN WHO INDICATE THAT THERE IS SOME TYPE OF TRAINING THEY THINK REPLACEMENTS TO THEIR OUTFITS SHOULD BE GETTING MORE OF...

| OFFICERS | 71% |
| ENLISTED MEN | 52% |

TRAINING IN SPECIFIC JOBS

While there is some disagreement between recommendations made by officers and those made by enlisted men, they tend to concur on major points. For example, both officers and men often emphasize the need for artillery replacements having more training in the specific job to which they are assigned. As one 1st Lieutenant put it:

"Need more specialists—too many of the new men have only a general knowledge of artillery and are not prepared to take over any job. In combat there is no time for training."

This sentiment was echoed by many other officers and enlisted men. The following comments are typical:

"I have never yet received a replacement trained in our basic weapon—the 105mm How." (Capt.)

"Actual training of their particular arm before entering the particular outfit." (Pvt.)

"Give them more training in one particular job—instead of a little bit of each." (Cpl.)
ARTILLERY REPLACEMENTS

ALL-AROUND ARTILLERY TRAINING

While large numbers of officers and men are agreed that replacements need training in at least one specialty, many point out further that all-around training is also essential. The gist of their remarks runs something like this: "The replacement should be a specialist. But he must also know enough about a smattering of Artillery jobs to be able to fill in wherever he is needed."

"Only change—quit typing the man before the line gets him. Let company officers fit him in his slot and specialize him." (Capt.)

"I think their training should be general for it is often necessary to change their jobs." (1st Lt.)

"They should be able to do everything. Maybe a soldier is killed and there is no one to take his place." (Pvt.)

"All around knowledge of the other fellow's job in their outfit." (Pvt.)

SMALL ARMS TRAINING

The artilleryman usually has need for small arms training only when he is defending his position against close-up attack, but this emergency is sufficiently common to make large numbers of enlisted men and some officers single it out.

"Artillery should have a better knowledge of small arms and should be qualified as riflemen, machine gunners and grenade throwers." (Capt.)

"The artillery should have more training in the defense of their positions, more rifle practice, training with infantry weapons." (Cpl.)

"Use of individual weapons and such weapons as are used for close in defense such as machine guns—hand grenades, etc." (1st Sgt.)

"Use of small arms. We have never had enough." (Sgt.)

TRAINING FOR SPECIAL CLIMATE AND TERRAIN

Though it is impossible to train men to fight in all kinds of climates on all kinds of terrain, many officers and men point out the need to train replacements for fighting under conditions which they are slated to encounter before sending them up front. (This policy is feasible, of course, only when it is definitely known just where a man is to fight.)

"In this theater, jungle tactics should be emphasized strongly. Amphibious training and teach every man to swim." (Capt.)

"Train the men in jungle terrain before sending them into jungle combat." (1st. Lt.)

"If they are to fight in the islands train them for it. They will need all they can get for it is hell." (Pfc.)

"Should spend more time in the field. Jungle fighting is hell and men have to live in jungle all the time while on the islands." (Cpl.)

"Men should learn to know and understand the jungle so they will lose their fear." (Sgt.)

MISCELLANEOUS TRAINING RECOMMENDATIONS

While the topics discussed above are by far the most frequently mentioned, various other training recommendations are made by small minorities of both officers and men. Among them are the following:

1. More training under fire.
2. More technical training in communications, fire direction, etc.
3. More training in personal care and care of equipment.
4. More training in military courtesy and discipline.

A FINAL NOTE

In a large sense the training recommendations in this report apply to all artillerymen—not simply those who are being trained as replacements. There seems little doubt that the best artilleryman is one who knows the ins and outs of his own specialty and something about the other fellow’s specialty as well.
A STUDY OF MORALE IN AN AAF FIGHTER COMMAND

Even a crack fighter command may have morale areas that can stand improvement

Source: Study of a cross section of enlisted ground crew men in an overseas Fighter Command and a cross section of AGF enlisted men in the same theater.

This is a study of enlisted men in a Fighter Command operating in a tremendously tough zone. The pilots of this Command have flown and are flying some of the most dangerous air missions of the war. This is a study -- not of the flyers in the Command -- but of the enlisted men who keep their planes flying.

On its record the Fighter Command need bow to no other. Its morale is high -- as can be judged from the figures in this report which compare attitudes of the enlisted men in the Command with attitudes of a representative cross section of AGF enlisted men on selected morale items.

That the morale of the Fighter Command -- however high -- is not ideal in at least two important areas is illustrated by the fact that the Command does not rate higher than a typical AGF cross section on the following: 1) attitudes toward promotions; 2) feeling that recognition is given to those who do good work. (See next page.)

It is agreed that most AAF outfits -- for reasons inherent in the extra "glam-or" and post-war value of the work they do -- have an initial advantage over most AGF outfits on many matters related to morale. Failure of the Fighter Command men to rate higher than an AGF cross section on their attitudes toward promotions thus reveals that there may be room for improvement in this area.

(Note: Wherever questions asked of the men in the Fighter Command were comparable to those asked men in the AGF outfits, comparisons are included in the bar graphs following.)
ATTITUDES TOWARD OFFICERS

Because the morale of any command is so closely tied up with men's opinions of their leaders, it is essential that men who think highly of their officers abilities and their interest in them. The enlisted man who respects his officers and is sure that they appreciate his work is a better soldier because of that respect and appreciation.

As the graphs show, the Fighter Command generally rates high in this area.

Do pilots appreciate the work done by enlisted men on the line and in the shops?

- HALF OR MOST DO: 80
- MOST DO NOT: 20

Does the officer in charge know his stuff?

- VERY WELL; FAIRLY WELL: 74
- NOT WELL; NOT WELL AT ALL: 26

PROMOTIONS AND RECOGNITION FOR WORK DONE

Men want to be rewarded for work well done. This reward can come in many forms of which the two most effective are obviously promotions and recognitions.

Do officers know men's abilities?

- HAVE GOOD IDEA;
- FAIR IDEA
- LITTLE OR NO IDEA

Do promotions go to the deserving?

- HALF THE TIME;
- USUALLY; ALWAYS
- SOMETIMES; RARELY OR NEVER

Do men usually get recognition or praise for a job well done?

- USUALLY; ALWAYS
- RARELY; NEVER

That men's attitudes toward promotions in the Fighter Command are no better than those among typical AGF troops is further reflected when fully 48 percent of them say that the biggest help in getting promoted in their outfit is having an "in" with the right people.
"First in importance will be the development of a high morale and the building of a sound discipline, based on wise leadership and a spirit of mutual cooperation throughout all ranks. Morale, engendered by thoughtful consideration for officers and enlisted men by their commanders, will produce a cheerful and understanding subordination of the individual to the good of the team. This is the essence of the American standard of discipline and it is the primary responsibility of leaders to develop and maintain such a standard."

GEN. GEORGE C. MARSHALL,
in a letter to commanding generals
HOW THE STUDIES ARE MADE

The articles in this bulletin are based on attitude surveys conducted by the Research Branch, Morale Services Division and the research units reporting to the commanding generals of the several theaters.

The staff of the Research Branch is composed of Army officers who are experienced in the field of surveys, together with a number of civilian specialists. Techniques have been developed, tested and adjusted to fit the Army's problems.

The basic steps in conducting a study are as follows:

1. **The questionnaire is prepared** in consultation with the War Department branches, or the theater command immediately concerned. Questions are carefully chosen to provide the exact type of information desired.

2. **The questionnaire is pre-tested.** That is, the questions are tried out on small groups of men to determine whether they are meaningful and understandable to the type of men or officers to be studied.

3. **The project is cleared** for action with the commands in which the study is to be made.

4. **The number of men to be surveyed** is set sufficiently large to insure statistically reliable findings.

5. **The men to be surveyed** are selected to insure as true a cross section of the group to be studied as possible. A cross section of enlisted men in the United States, for example, is so drawn as to give proper proportionate representation to each branch of the Army, to men in each stage of training, and to men stationed in the various sections of the country. It is, of course, possible to get cross sections of a single branch, of a division, of Negro troops, or any other portion of the Army desired.

6. **The men complete questionnaires** under conditions of absolute anonymity. They are assembled in small groups, and hear a short introduction given by a specially trained class leader. This introduction makes it clear to the men that only their frank opinion is wanted, and that they are not being tested or spied on. If the group is composed of enlisted men, the class leader is an enlisted man, and no officers are present during the session. No names or serial numbers are placed on the questionnaires. Ordinarily, illiterates or men of very low intelligence are interviewed by specially trained enlisted men.

7. **The data are analyzed** by specialists in attitude research analysis. Reports of these analysts are released to agencies concerned, and also form the basis for the material presented in this bulletin.

The procedure outlined above is that followed in the typical cross section survey. Other techniques, of course, are employed from time to time in special situations.