WAR DEPARTMENT,

What the Soldier Thinks, Number 2, A Monthly Digest of War Department Studies on the Attitudes of American Troops, is published for the information and guidance of all concerned.

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SOLDIERS WHO HAVE SEEN BATTLE REALIZE THE TOUGHNESS OF THE JOB AHEAD

Battle veterans are more realistic than men in American training camps

Source: Study of a sample of enlisted men in rifle companies in a division which fought in the Mediterranean area.

Overseas veterans of long, rigorous battles show little evidence of the overconfidence so likely to be characteristic of troops in training throughout Continental United States. Their tendency, instead, is to recognize what a tough job lies ahead; they seem to feel that our losses in men and materials will be heavy and costly.

Soldiers who are still in training camps or on maneuvers in the United States are much more apt to regard the road ahead as one that will be rather easy. It is difficult for them to believe that the enemy they meet may be their match in terms of fighting ability, fighting equipment, and leadership.

Our men who have met and overcome enemy troops know from experience that they are hard, crafty, seasoned fighters with plenty of determination to win. They are not likely to underestimate the enemy's ability.

Men who have won the Silver Star for gallantry in battle are even more likely than other combat veterans to expect the job ahead to be tough.

ENEMY WEAPONS

The superiority of American weapons might well be taken for granted if we form our opinions solely from magazine ads we see or from news stories we read or hear over the radio. Overenthusiastic noncom lecturers or officers in basic training centers may have given many new soldiers the idea that the equipment they get is beyond question better than any owned by the enemy.

Excellent as is the equipment our soldiers take with them into battle and important as it is for our soldiers to have confidence in it, proper respect for the enemy's weapons of war and equipment is equally important. Soldiers who have not been in overseas combat are more likely than veterans of hard battles to feel that all our fighting equipment is superior to that of the enemy.

Nearly half of the men who have been fighting the Germans think that some German weapon is superior to ours. Among those most frequently mentioned are: first, the German mortars and next, the German machine guns.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VETERANS WHO HAVE FOUGHT GERMANS SEE TOUGH JOB AHEAD WITH HEAVY LOSSES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>QUESTION: &quot;Which comes closest to your idea of how hard it is going to be to beat the Germans?&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| AMONG... |
| INFANTRY CROSS SILVER IN SECTION OF STAR U.S. VETERANS VETERANS |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERCENTAGE WHO SAY:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tough job, with heavy losses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77% 84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tough job, but losses not too heavy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51% 13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very hard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12% 8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONFIDENCE IN COMBAT OFFICERS

Men's confidence in company officers in combat is closely related to belief in officers' concern for men's welfare

Source: Study of combat veterans who served in the North African campaign.

If a battle-experienced soldier believes his company officers take a personal interest in their men, he also tends to believe that his officers are men he would be willing to follow in battle.

It cannot be assumed that there is a clear cause-and-effect relationship between men's confidence in their company leaders and the leaders' concern for the welfare of the men. There may be a tendency to "idealize" the admired leader or to "run down" the leader who is not admired. At any rate, few enlisted men will admit that their leaders are good in one respect and poor in another.

BUILDING CONFIDENCE

How is that confidence won? Soldier opinion cannot be conclusive on this point, but the close relationship shown in the chart suggests that confidence in battlefield leadership does not depend alone on the junior officer's tactical competence, but also depends on his success in convincing men of his intelligent and just concern for their welfare.

Obviously, there are many specific

| RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ANSWERS OF ENLISTED MEN TO TWO QUESTIONS ON OFFICERS |
| QUESTION: "How many of your officers take a personal interest in their men?" |
| QUESTION: "How many of the officers in your company are the kind you would want to serve under in combat?" |

Among...

...men who say all or most of their officers take a personal interest in their men

...men who say about half of their officers take a personal interest in their men

...men who say few or none of their officers take a personal interest in their men

PERCENTAGE WHO SAY THAT ALL OR MOST OF THE OFFICERS IN THEIR COMPANY ARE THE KIND THEY WOULD WANT TO SERVE UNDER IN COMBAT

80%

30%

12%
ways—long before battle as well as during and after battle—in which the officer can manifest by deeds, not just words, his sincere interest in the personal welfare of his men.

Veteran combat soldiers in this study were divided into three groups:

**Group A** is composed of the men who say that all or most of both their company officers and their company noncoms are the kind they would want to follow in battle.

**Group B** is composed of all men who do not fall into Group A or Group C.

**Group C** is composed of the men who say that relatively few of their company officers and noncoms are the kind they would want to follow in battle.

**CONFIDENCE IS RELATED TO OTHER ATTITUDES**

How do the attitudes of men in Group A differ from those in Group C?

28% more of the men in Group A than in Group C say that, in general, they got supplies at the front as needed.

27% more of the men in Group A than in Group C think their leaders tried hard enough to get food to the men at the battle front.

19% more of the men in Group A than in Group C think their leaders tried hard enough to get mail to the men at the battle front.

21% more of the men in Group A than in Group C think that Silver Stars for gallantry went to the men who deserved them.

28% more of the men in Group A than in Group C feel that a man in their outfit with ability has a good chance for promotion.

**Attitude Toward Combat**

28% more of the men in Group A than in Group C say they are ready to go back into the next battle.

15% more of the men in Group A than in Group C feel confident that they would do well themselves in charge of a combat mission under enemy fire.

**Job and Personal Problems**

25% more of the men in Group A than in Group C are enthusiastic about their Army job.

26% more of the men in Group A than in Group C think they are playing an important part in winning the war.

20% more of the men in Group A than in Group C say that their officers are helpful with personal problems, such as troubles about pay, allotments, and the like.

17% more of the men in Group A than in Group C say that furloughs and passes are distributed regularly.

**CONCLUSIONS**

In interpreting the data above, a caution must be inserted against assuming that any one of the specific situations would, if improved, markedly improve the respect for the company leadership. But all of them together do add up to document the point that there is a close relationship between a soldier's confidence in leaders in battle and the concern he thinks those leaders have for the personal problems of the men.

**USO SHOWS**

*Source: A study of enlisted men in one overseas area in the Western Hemisphere.*

Four in five men in the area surveyed say that they have seen one or more USO shows since leaving the United States.

Of the men who have seen USO shows in that area, four out of five say that they are "pretty good" or "very good." Men in the United States who answered the same question recently are slightly more inclined than are the overseas men to rate the shows "very good."

The large majority of men surveyed overseas think well of the USO performers.
WHO GOES AWOL—AND WHY?

Some facts on types of men most likely to go “over the hill” and on their problems

Source: Army studies of a cross section of the enlisted men in the U.S., and of selected groups of new recruits, AWOL prisoners, and mental patients in Army hospitals.

What kind of men go AWOL? What reasons do they and their fellow soldiers give to explain their behavior? Army studies, not yet entirely complete, already throw some new light on these questions.

WHAT KIND OF MEN GO AWOL?
The company commander who seeks to reduce his AWOL rate will do well to pay special attention to the problems which develop among the following:

1. Soldiers with little education or low intelligence
2. Soldiers who are married
3. Enlisted men who volunteered for the Army before Pearl Harbor

These are the men most likely to go AWOL as the charts on this page indicate.

WHAT REASONS DO SOLDIERS GIVE FOR GOING AWOL?
As has been shown, certain types of men are more predisposed than others by

PERCENTAGE OF VOLUNTEERS WITH OVER 2 YEARS ARMY SERVICE

Men who are volunteers with more than 2 years of Army service

All other soldiers
personality characteristics to go over the hill. But not all who are predisposed actually go AWOL. What determines whether a man will go? Many factors, of course, and among them are conditions in Army life which are to some extent subject to modification by the alert commanding officer.

A representative cross section of enlisted men in Continental U. S. was asked:

"Did you ever know anyone who went AWOL for more than 24 hours? If so, why do you think he went AWOL?"

Nearly half of the soldiers who are acquainted with an AWOL say that the primary reason was that the man could not get a furlough when he wanted or needed it. A summary of the reasons given by the soldiers follows:

1. Couldn't get a furlough when he wanted or needed it. . . . . 48%
   Homesickness, unfair furlough treatment, family illness, wife about to have a child, to visit wife, wife's rumored infidelity, to see a girl, to get married, etc.

2. Poor adjustment to the Army. . . . . 27%
   Dislike of the Army, dissatisfied, headstrong, difficulties with superiors, to escape monotony briefly, lack of freedom, insufficient recreation, dislike of camp or outfit, dislike of job, fear of fighting, etc.

3. Personal abnormalities . . . . . . 21%
   Drunkenness and addiction to liquor, poor judgment, irresponsible desire for a good time, "can't take it," crazy, ignorant, stupid.

4. Other circumstances. . . . . . . 4%
   Unavoidable over-staying of leave, lack of patriotism, etc.

It is also of interest to know what excuses are given for their conduct by AWOL's themselves. Several hundred AWOL's were given the chance to speak under the protection of anonymity, which resulted in more frankness than otherwise could be obtained.

Most frequent allegation by the AWOL's was that officers did not keep promises about granting leaves. Whether true or not, it is likely that in many cases company commanders had not announced or followed a definite leave policy and may have permitted subordinates to show partiality in granting emergency leaves. Other frequent complaints relate to alleged job misassignment and to real or imagined sickness.

While such reasons given by AWOL's themselves must be heavily discounted, they are important to know because they suggest that commanding officers, by vigilant and understanding action, could have prevented some of these offenses. It is significant to note for example, that nearly 50 per cent of a representative cross section of soldiers in the Army in the U.S. think that the pass or furlough policy in their units is unfair.

HOW AWOL MEN RESEMBLE AND DIFFER FROM PSYCHIATRIC CASES

Studies of AWOL psychology have been made in recent months. Army psychiatrists and medical officers have found that a surprising proportion of AWOL's are mental cases who may not belong in the Army and that others display unusual mental symptoms which require close watching. These symptoms often take the form of complaints about aches, pains or other sickness when doctors cannot always find physical signs of illness. Psychiatrists call them "psychosomatic complaints." Included are such things as fainting spells, upset stomach, sick headaches, heartbeat making it hard to go to sleep, nightmares, hands trembling, cold sweats, and shortness of breath.

PERCENTAGE WHO CLAIM THEY HAVE SOME PARTICULAR PHYSICAL OR HEALTH PROBLEM

| AMONG MENTAL PATIENTS IN ARMY HOSPITALS | . . . . 73% |
| AMONG AWOL'S | . . . . 56% |
| AMONG AVERAGE NEW RECRUITS | . . . . 33% |
The chart just shown indicates that the AWOL is more likely than the average recruit to claim he has some physical or health problem, though not as likely as the neuropsychiatric patient. Almost six out of every ten AWOL's claim they have some particular physical or health problem; the proportion is about seven out of ten among mental patients in Army hospitals; and only about three out of ten among average new recruits.

Histories of AWOL cases show that these men also tend to be similar to mental cases in their inability to get along with people. Charted below, for example, are answers to the question, "Before you came into the Army, did you usually like to be by yourself or to be with other people?"

Neuropsychiatric patients and AWOL's tend to differ sharply, however, in their reports about two aspects of childhood behavior. The AWOL's tended to like getting into fights, and they tended to dislike school, whereas neuropsychiatric patients on the average, tended to dislike fights and to like school, as the charts show.

Such findings are in line with the interpretation that those AWOL's who are not actually neuropsychiatric cases resemble the latter in that both are attempting to escape from what they consider an unpleasant environment. However, the mental patient escapes by turning inward, the AWOL by aggressive action or physical separation from what is unpleasant.

Commanders should cooperate with unit psychiatrists by referring to them all AWOL's (especially repeaters) who they suspect need psychiatric assistance.

### SOME RULES TO HELP COMPANY COMMANDERS TO REDUCE AWOL RATES

1. "Get acquainted with your men as rapidly as you can, and encourage them to come to you.
2. "Set up a planned furlough policy.
3. "Help your men to handle their personal problems.
4. "Refer problem cases to the unit psychiatrist.
5. "Make sure your job classification and assignments are good."

From ABSENCE WITHOUT LEAVE, a booklet on Problems of Command shortly to be published as War Department Pamphlet No. 20-5.
Through the long winter nights, American ground crews are repairing the fighter and bomber planes that carry the fight to the enemy in western Europe. These men are teammates of the flying personnel, sharing their sense of achievement—and the sense of loss that comes with heavy casualties. They do not, however, share the risks of battle to any great extent.

Among these men, pride in squadron is more general than among other enlisted men in the Air Corps in the same theater, and markedly more general than pride in company among other Service Force troops in the same theater.

These men also are more likely than other types of enlisted men in their theater to feel that the job they are doing is worthwhile.

But even among the ground crews servicing combat planes there is a considerable minority who feel that they ought to be in some other Army job.

In some cases such dissatisfaction with job assignment may be due not alone to misclassification or misassignment but also to dissatisfaction with the leadership supplied by junior officers.

Research among soldiers throughout the world shows a close relationship between the soldier’s satisfaction with his Army job and his belief that his officers take a personal interest in their men. The successful unit commander, it would appear, discharges two responsibilities in this connection: (1) He gives a fair hearing to cases of bad misassignment and effects transfers where possible; (2) Where transfer is impossible, he carefully and understandingly explains the reasons why and does his best to "sell" the soldier on the importance of his present assignment.
FRONT-LINE INFANTRYMEN KNOW THE IMPORTANCE OF THE RIFLEMAN

Respect for Infantry's part in modern war is high among men who have fought through tough campaigns

Source: Study of enlisted combat veterans who fought on both sides of the Mediterranean.

Front-line foot soldiers who have been tested in repeated battles against the Germans are, almost without exception, thoroughly convinced of the importance of the rifleman in modern war. This attitude is revealed in a recent survey of an overseas veteran group.

Army studies have shown that many soldiers in this country—even Infantrymen—are doubtful of Infantry's importance. Such doubts can lower the Infantryman's morale and reduce his zeal for training.

Soldiers at the front know better! A survey of a group of men in Infantry rifle companies that went through some of the fiercest large-scale actions seen by American troops in this war are, almost without exception, thoroughly convinced that the rifleman has a job of importance.

These men are convinced of the importance of their job, and show a high degree of pride in outfit. The chart opposite provides valuable comparisons between the veterans and troops in the United States.

A great deal of work is now being done to strengthen the confidence Infantrymen feel in the work of their branch. It may be that the findings presented here can be used in this confidence-building campaign. Men who may not be impressed by the reasoned case presented by high officers may react favorably to this proof that enlisted men who really know what this war is like place a high value on Infantry's contribution.
SPECIFIC PROBLEMS OF ORIENTATION

Source: Questionnaire surveys among enlisted men in two overseas theaters and in Continental United States, in the last half of 1943.

Officers charged with giving their men an understanding of the war and its progress have at their disposal many excellently devised materials. Newspapers, radio, Newsmap, orientation films, and other materials can assist greatly in an orientation program.

Useful tips on some practical problems of orientation are provided by the answers enlisted men have given on a series of anonymous questionnaire surveys.

THE NEED Enlisted men not only recognize the need for orientation; they also want it and appreciate receiving it. However, only one in four of the enlisted men both overseas and in the United States says he has a fairly complete and up-to-date knowledge of the news. Nine out of ten who say they aren't well informed say they wish they were.

THE MEANS Enlisted men express the need for news; it is important that they feel that the Army is concerned with this need. They get this feeling more strongly if orientation media are made available to them.

NEWSMAP Newsmap clicks with the men. Seven out of eight in the United States who have seen Newsmap say it helps them to keep up with the news. Men who see it every week are much more likely to think it helps a lot than are men who see it less often, but only one man in three sees it every week.

Newsmap is often hung in places where it is not most useful. A fifth of the men say they don't look at Newsmap more often because it is not posted where they can see it.

WHY DON'T SOLDIERS KEEP UP WITH THE NEWS?

Per cent of men who say they don't have a complete and up-to-date knowledge of the news who blame this situation on...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOLDIERS IN:</th>
<th>&quot;LACK OF FACILITIES&quot;</th>
<th>&quot;LACK OF TIME&quot;</th>
<th>&quot;NOT INTERESTED&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Overseas Theater</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Overseas Theater</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continental United States</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**MOST MEN RECOMMEND POSTING NEWSMAP IN DAYROOM OR BARRACKS**

(Based on a cross section of enlisted men in U. S.)

QUESTION: "Where is the Newsmap hung in this camp?" (This question limited to men seeing Newsmap)

QUESTION: "Where do you think is the best place to hang a Newsmap?"

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**NEWSMAP HOST HELPFUL WHEN USED WITH TALKS**

Two-fifths of the men studied in both overseas theaters say they have not heard orientation talks.

In the United States, more than half the men say they get too few talks on why we are fighting this war. More than half of the soldiers state a preference for talks that are followed by discussion and for reports which explain the significance of the news.

Men in one overseas theater were questioned about a recently inaugurated series of weekly discussion meetings. At these meetings discussions on various subjects are led by an officer or noncom, and everyone has an opportunity to express opinions or ask questions. Six men in ten say they think they are "very much worthwhile," and about four-fifths say that the discussion leaders have done a good job so far. Only one man in ten thinks the meetings are a waste of time. Five out of ten men say they prefer having an officer as discussion leader, one in seven prefers a noncom as leader, and not quite four in ten men say it "makes no difference."
Postwar plans are ranked a clear first among the topics from which enlisted men in the United States and overseas were asked to select the one about which they'd like to know most.

A vast majority of soldiers surveyed overseas and in Continental United States indicate that they're "very much interested" in hearing talks by officers and enlisted men who have actually participated in combat during this war.

Talks are judged more helpful by those men who hear them during regular duty hours.

### TALKS GIVEN DURING REGULAR DUTY HOURS JUDGED MORE HELPFUL

**QUESTION:** "How much do these talks help you to understand why we are fighting this war?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TALKS GIVEN...</th>
<th>PER CENT WHO SAY &quot;HELP A LOT&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DURING DUTY HOURS</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ON OFF-DUTY TIME</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Limited to those men who are given talks.

### "WHY WE FIGHT" FILMS

War Department directives provide that every soldier be shown all the orientation films of the "Why We Fight" series. Last August, one enlisted man in every eight in the United States said he had seen none of these films, and only three out of every ten men said they had seen all four that had been released at the time.

As mentioned in the December issue of this digest, there is a positive relationship between the number of films men have seen and their interest in and knowledge of the background of this war.

### CIVILIAN CHANNELS

Civilian channels (the newspapers and radio) continue to furnish most of the news received by the enlisted man located in the United States.

Seventy-nine per cent of the men say newspapers are a main source of news for them. Radio is a main source for 70 per cent, and newsreels for 58 per cent.

One-half of the men say that they listen to a news broadcast each day, and one-third of them say they read a newspaper daily.

### THE AUDIENCE

Men's interest in the news varies to some extent with education and length of service. The better educated men are more often interested in the news than are the less educated, and the men with longer service are more likely than men with shorter service to be interested in the news.

*Newsmap* and the *Daily War News Summary* are valued equally by the educated and less educated soldier. However, talks on why we are fighting appear to be most helpful if they come early in a man's training and they are especially appreciated by the less educated man.
SOLDIERS ARE SPORTS-MINDED

Both as participant and spectator
the G.I. wants plenty of athletics and games

Source: Survey of cross section of enlisted men in the U.S. and a study of enlisted men who are patients in general hospitals.

"The conduct of athletics in the Army," reads MR 1-10 Par. 34, "is closely associated with training, from both the standpoint of physical development and the building up of an aggressive spirit. In addition, athletics as a recreational activity will always have a great influence in building up morale. This is particularly true of competitive athletics, if properly conducted, both from the standpoint of the participants, who receive double benefit therefrom, and the spectators, who are afforded a recreational activity of great value in creating an atmosphere of contentment and pride of organization in any command."

The American soldier likes sports and believes in their importance as recreation and as a means of physical conditioning. Ninety per cent of the enlisted men in Continental United States feel that sports are a great help in getting men ready for combat.

Yet over half of the men report that they did not participate in any kind of sport either during duty hours or free time in the week prior to the study. Only 10 per cent of the men say they play on regular outfit or post teams.

Men's statements give us information on the gap between men's desire for sports and their actual participation:

1. Only 24 per cent of the men think there are enough regular athletic teams at their post.
2. Thirty-one per cent say there is no place at their camp where they can take part in their favorite sport. Another 33 per cent say that there is not a really good place.
3. Thirty-three per cent say they do not have or can't get enough equipment to take part in their favorite sport, and 66 per cent do not think the equipment they have is good.

Obviously, the commander cannot always obtain adequate equipment for all the sports favored by his men. He does, however, have a responsibility to take advantage of all available resources in making possible a program of sports which makes a maximum contribution to morale and physical conditioning.

SPECTATOR SPORTS VERSUS PARTICIPANT SPORTS

Sports have two types of appeal. They may be liked because they are good games to play. And they may be liked because they provide a good show to watch.

Participant sports are good for improving both morale and physical condition. Spectator sports are of entertainment value—good for morale but of no importance in physical conditioning for spectators.

Three sports are liked "a lot" both as spectator and as participant sports by a majority of enlisted men. They are baseball, swimming, and softball.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SPORTS MOST MEN LIKE TO PLAY AND WATCH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>BASEBALL</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As Spectator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As Participant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SWIMMING</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As Spectator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As Participant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SOFTBALL</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As Spectator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As Participant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Three other sports are liked "a lot" by half or more of the men as sports to watch, and are also liked "a lot" as sports to take part in by a third to a half of the men. Football is, in fact, the most popular of all spectator sports.

### Other Sports Rated High by Both Spectators and Participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sport</th>
<th>As Spectator</th>
<th>As Participant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Football</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basketball</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bowling</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Boxing and wrestling are outstanding examples of sports which most men like to watch, but in which few like to take part.

### Popular Spectator Sports

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sport</th>
<th>As Spectator</th>
<th>As Participant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Boxing</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wrestling</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other sports soldiers mention less frequently as ones they like to play or to watch are listed in the next column. Some of these sports have never been tried by a good many soldiers. Badminton has never been tried by 48 per cent of the soldiers, golf by 42 per cent, soccer by 42 per cent, and tennis by 31 per cent.

### Minority Sport Choices of the Soldier as Spectator

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sport</th>
<th>Per Cent Who Say &quot;Like A Lot&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Track</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Touch Football</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ping Pong</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volley Ball</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horseshoe Pitching</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennis</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hand Ball</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soccer</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golf</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Badminton</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Minority Sport Choices of the Soldier as Participant

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sport</th>
<th>Per Cent Who Say &quot;Like A Lot&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Volley Ball</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Touch Football</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ping Pong</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horseshoe Pitching</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hand Ball</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Track</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennis</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golf</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soccer</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Badminton</td>
<td>15%</td>
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ARMY SPORTS IN THE TROPICS

On a steaming tropical island turned into an active theater of war, American soldiers remain essentially American in their sports choices. The more violent sports lose some of their popularity as the temperature soars and the humidity drenches men in perspiration. Some of the standbys of troops back home—bowling, for instance—are obviously out of consideration because of lack of equipment.

But swimming, softball, and baseball, the three favorite participant sports in the U.S., are the leaders among American troops who are fighting in a tropical theater.

The men were asked to name the three sports or athletic games which they "would like most to take part in during your off-duty time over here." Here are the sports, ranked in order of mentions:

1. Swimming 6. Ping Pong
2. Softball 7. Basketball
5. Volleyball 10. Boxing

The importance of fishing as recreation in an Army which does much of its fighting near the ocean is worthy of note—and its contribution to a varied diet may not be negligible.

The relatively high place given to volleyball and ping pong may reflect either a climatic difference, or the fact that these games can be played informally with "pick-up" competition in small spaces with little equipment.

Only one man in three in the tropical area surveyed reports that he took part in sports in a typical week. About half of those who did take part confined themselves to such light activities as swimming, ping pong, horseshoes, or fishing.

Most of the men who did not take part in sports in a typical week blamed their failure on the heavy work load typical of this active theater. Many men said they "just did not feel like it." Although few mentioned the weather as a specific reason for not participating, it is quite likely that climate was a contributing factor.

It is significant that only one man in every eight who did not take part in sports said he did not have the necessary sports equipment.

WHAT HOSPITAL CONVALESCENTS LIKE TO PLAY

The problem of providing suitable recreation for convalescents in hospitals is one of considerable importance. Here are the games which convalescents, able to take part in them, would like most to play at general hospitals in the United States.

The first six games preferred are shown in rank order for three types of recreation.
OUR MEN LIKE THE BRITISH

Most G.I.'s in Britain like the British
and liking is greatest among men stationed there longest

Source: Survey of a representative cross section of American enlisted men in Great Britain, November 1943.

Our soldiers in Great Britain give little comfort to German experts who hoped that Americans could not get along with the British.

By a large majority, our men say they like the British. The proportion liking the British is highest among those with long service in England, lowest among those with short service—but even the newcomers state, in three cases out of five, that they like the British.

A majority of the men also say that the British like American soldiers.

These facts were obtained from anonymous questionnaires in which men had every opportunity to air their grievances.

LIKING FOR THE BRITISH IS GREATEST AMONG MEN LONG IN BRITAIN

Among men who have been in Britain...

...Less than 3 months

LIKE THE BRITISH: 63%
SOMETHAT IRRITATED BY BRITISH: 22%
DISLIKE THE BRITISH: 15%

...3 to less than 6 months

LIKE THE BRITISH: 67%
SOMETHAT IRRITATED BY BRITISH: 23%
DISLIKE THE BRITISH: 10%

...6 months to less than 1 year

LIKE THE BRITISH: 74%
SOMETHAT IRRITATED BY BRITISH: 19%
DISLIKE THE BRITISH: 7%

...1 year and over

LIKE THE BRITISH: 78%
SOMETHAT IRRITATED BY BRITISH: 13%
DISLIKE THE BRITISH: 7%
SOLDIERS WANT TO KNOW THE SCORE

Combat veterans feel their company officers could have told them more about the campaign in which they served.

Source: Study of Infantrymen who fought through the Sicilian Campaign.

It is often literally true that the front-line soldier knows less about a campaign in which he fights than do the newspaper readers back home. Battle, to the individual soldier, may be no more than a skirmish in a small patch of woods, a bloody attack up one hill, or an ugly scrap in a country hamlet.

The larger strategy of the campaign, its objectives, and its general progress are often complete mysteries to the soldier. But he wants to know about these things—for without such knowledge, he can not judge the importance of his own part in the fight.

A majority of enlisted men who fought in one division in Sicily report that they believe their officers could have done more to explain to them how their company's part fitted into the general plan of campaign.

Three-quarters of the men say they want this information. It may not be a simple case of cause and effect, but it is true that the men who feel that their leaders did give them as much information as they could about their part in the fighting are more likely than other men to show a relatively high degree of mental readiness for further combat.

WHAT CAN BE DONE

Problems of communications and considerations of security may limit sharply the company commander's ability to supply this type of information. It seems clear, however, that men should be given as much information as possible to show them that their sacrifices have a place in a sound plan which is bringing victory closer. It may be possible for Orientation Officers to assemble and clear some information on this subject for dissemination by company officers at the front, and it certainly should be possible for them to supply such information to the companies when they are withdrawn from the front lines.

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MEN FEEL THEY COULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN MORE INFORMATION

QUESTION: "While you were at the battlefront, did your leaders explain the whole battle so you could see how your company's part fitted into the campaign as a whole?"

ANSWERS:

"As much as they could"... 32%

"They could have given us a little more"... 27%

"They could have given us a great deal more"... 41%
HOW THE STUDIES ARE MADE

The staff of the Research Branch of the Morale Services Division is composed of Army officers who are experienced in the field of surveys, together with a number of civilian specialists. Techniques have been developed, tested and adjusted to fit the Army's problems.

The basic steps in conducting a study are as follows:

1. The questionnaire is prepared in consultation with the War Department branches, or the theater command immediately concerned. Questions are carefully chosen to provide the exact type of information desired. A complete plan of attack on the problem is worked out in advance.

2. The questionnaire is pre-tested. That is, the questions are tried out on small groups of men to determine whether they are meaningful and understandable to the type of men or officers to be studied. Personal interviews check on whether the questions are really getting at the central problem under consideration.

3. The project is cleared for action with the commands in which the study is to be made.

4. The number of men to be surveyed is set sufficiently large to insure statistically reliable findings.

5. The men to be surveyed are selected to insure as true a cross section of the group to be studied as possible. A cross section of enlisted men in the United States, for example, is so drawn as to give proper proportionate representation to each branch of the Army, to men in each stage of training, and to men stationed in the various sections of the country. It is, of course, possible to get cross sections of a single branch, of a division, of Negro troops, or any other portion of the Army desired.

6. The men complete questionnaires under conditions of absolute anonymity. They are assembled in small groups, and hear a short introduction given by a specially trained class leader. This introduction makes it clear to the men that only their frank opinion is wanted, and that they are not being tested or spied on. If the group is composed of enlisted men, the class leader is an enlisted man, and no officers are present during the session. No names or serial numbers are placed on the questionnaires. Ordinarily, illiterates or men of very low intelligence are interviewed by specially trained enlisted men.

7. The data are analyzed by specialists in attitude research analysis. Reports of these analysts are released to agencies concerned, and also form the basis for the material presented in this bulletin.

The procedure outlined above is that followed in the typical cross section survey. Other techniques, of course, are employed from time to time in special situations.
ABOUT THIS REPORT

The findings in this digest are based, in most cases, upon broad studies of general problems conducted by the Research Branch, Morale Services Division, ASF. The purpose is to provide commanders with information which will assist them in evaluating the status of morale. The applicability of these general findings to the specific situation of any given command will vary greatly. It is probably true that no commander will be able to apply all the findings to his problems, but it is equally probable that any commander will find some material of practical use to him.

The report is designed to be useful primarily to commanders of regiments and smaller units. Some of the problems discussed concern problems that require the direct intervention of the regimental commander and his staff. Others offer suggestions on matters that clearly call for action at the battalion, company or platoon level. Some of the data has relevance to all Army situations, while other data are significant only in certain branches or certain special situations.

HOW TO USE THIS REPORT

The following are suggestions for the maximum use of this report by regimental and battalion commanders:

1. Make sure that the report is studied by every staff officer concerned with personnel, training, or morale. Much of what it contains will only confirm their own personal observations, but there will be something new in it for even the most experienced officer.

2. If mimeographing facilities are available, reproduce those sections which apply particularly to company officers' problems, and distribute copies to every company officer, retaining the restricted classification. The charts are easy to copy. Perhaps you can point up the data to specific problems of your command by use of illustrative material from your own experience.

3. If lack of facilities prevents reproduction, your orientation officer may make use of this material in talks to junior officers, using a blackboard if possible. Officers new to command may be uninfluenced by mere advice from their more experienced elders; they cannot and will not ignore plain evidence, supported by figures, which demonstrates that their success or failure as leaders in training or in battle depends on certain fundamental habits and practices which can be acquired by study and which will win the respect and confidence of their men.