WHAT THE SOLDIER THINKS
A Monthly Digest of War Department Studies on the Attitudes of American Troops

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INCREASING PRODUCTION OF PORT BATTALIONS

The success of officer leadership in many ASF (SOS) outfits can often best be measured by the amount and kind of production the outfits put out. For this reason, the problem of boosting work output is one of the knottiest the Service Force officer ever wrestles with.

A study recently completed among white and Negro port battalion troops in a vital overseas area throws a good deal of light on means which officers can employ to get more work—more efficiently done—out of their men.

The troops studied are engaged in the vital job of unloading supplies from cargo ships—these supplies destined for troops at grips with the enemy. In a sense the whole progress of the combat operations in their theater rests on the dispatch with which they keep a steady flow of materials moving to the front.

That the men themselves recognize the importance of their work is evident. On the question of where they feel they would be doing most for the war effort, fully half of them name their present assignments as against being in the merchant marine.

From the above finding it may be deduced that the men are pretty well "sold" on their work. On the other hand, there is much that could be done to step up their work output by concentrating on such practical matters as the optimum number of hours to be worked each day, rewards for superior performance, competition as a stimulant to more production, and other work incentives.

Accordingly, the officers in charge of these port troops—both on the line and at port headquarters—were asked their ideas on these matters.

MAJORITY OF PORT BATTALION AND PORT HEADQUARTERS OFFICERS FAVOR 8-HOUR DAY

QUESTION: "In your opinion, how many hours per day should men be required to work to achieve maximum over-all output?"

Out of every 10 officers the following say "eight hours per day..."

AT PORT A (where 10-hour day is in effect)

AT PORT B (where work day has just been reduced from 12 to 8 hours)

AT PORT C (where 10-hour day is in effect)
As the chart on the preceding page indicates, a majority of officers at all three ports are in favor of limiting the work day to eight hours as a means of getting the most and best work out of the men.

The main reason given by officers favoring the 8-hour day is that no more work results from longer hours. As one officer puts it:

"Frequently our men are worked very long hours. From observation I have found that as much is accomplished in eight hours as in ten or twelve. After working several periods of ten or twelve hours men pace themselves and produce no more than a normal day's work."

Various work incentives are recommended by the port battalion and headquarters officers. The recommendations are listed here in order of their frequency:

1. Some Form of Time-Off

Several types of suggestions are made concerning when and how to use the time-off incentive. Some officers, for example, favor giving time-off for a job done before a deadline. As one officer puts it:

"For a job estimated to carry over the normal shift, if the men complete the job before the shift is over, they should be allowed to return home as a reward for their fast action."

Other officers recommend 48-hour passes either to town or to a rest area as a reward for meritorious work on the docks. An officer favoring rest area passes says:

"Week end pass to a rest camp in recognition of superior performance. This is hard work and men become fatigued even if they are not being shot at..."

Other types of time-off suggestions include giving everyone some free time at the end of each assignment (such as the discharging of a vessel) and giving rotation priority to those men doing the best work.

2. Praise, Decorations, Commendations or Publicity.

Work well done should be recognized and rewarded. Many officers state this principle as an effective means of stimulating production among port workers.

"When they do a good job they should be given some sort of commendation by higher authorities. It would mean something to them to know their work was appreciated by other than their own immediate officers."

"Decorations for work well done are too few. So many names have been submitted for Bronze Stars at this Port and returned with endorsement not favorably considered."

3. Looking After Men's Welfare

In the opinion of many officers, the best method for getting work out of men is to earn their devotion and respect by looking out for their welfare. It is interesting to note in this respect that a majority of the enlisted men at each port studied feel that their officers have not done everything possible to look out for their welfare on the job.

QUESTION: "Do you feel that about everything possible is done to look after the welfare of the men while they are on the job?"

Percentage of men saying, "No"...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Port</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Port A</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port B</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port C</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Even though a majority of enlisted men feel that their officers are not giving maximum attention to their welfare, it is significant that many officers consider maintenance of their men’s welfare vital to production. As one officer put it:

"Better facilities for living, working and bathing, and better service in securing necessary clothing and equipment. These men work hard and are doing a marvellous job. Their health and ability to carry on demands these things..."

4. Orientation on Importance of Work

One officer sums up a common feeling about orientation as a work incentive:

"If I can picture to the men exactly what happens to the cargo they handle, how it will help the combat men and so shorten the war, the incentive for doing a good job is better than anything I have discovered."

5. Giving Men More Responsibility, Encouraging Suggestions, etc.

When men have a share in the direction of their work, when they are rewarded for suggestions, it tends to have a beneficial effect on the work they do.

"Officers should encourage EM...to make suggestions. Irrespective of T/O or time in grade, any individual making a suggestion which materially improves the efficiency of operations should receive a promotion and the promotion and reason therefor should be announced to the entire organization."

6. Competition

In addition to the above incentives, two-thirds of the officers also feel that competition between various sections or companies is helpful as a means of increasing tonnage figures. Many of the officers make certain reservations on that score, however.

Competition among port workers is difficult to conduct, some officers say, because of the following factors:

1. Type of cargo and equipment for unloading cargo varies between outfits.

2. Careful supervision is needed to see that men do not become careless in their effort to speed up production.

3. If overdone, competition causes hard feelings and jealousy among the men.

Finally, some officers are opposed to competition on principle. They feel that there is something degrading about it, that in wartime men should work to win the war, and that in the long run, morale is the determining factor and not some form of artificial reward.

**IS COMPETITION A GOOD WORK INCENTIVE?**

"YES" say two-thirds of port officers

"NO" say one-third of port officers
WHAT SOLDIERS OVERSEAS WANT TO READ ABOUT

GI's the world over like the same features in YANK magazine

Source: Studies of cross sections of enlisted men in ETO, MTOUSA, CPBC, CBI, and in the U.S.

Are there any marked differences in the reading tastes of soldiers stationed in the various theaters and in the Zone of Interior?

Editors of Army publications which are addressed at GI's both at home and abroad have long speculated on the matter. Now a survey among all types of enlisted men in four overseas theaters and the U.S. supplies a tentative answer to the above question. That answer is no.

The survey was designed to find out what soldiers overseas and in the States think about YANK, "the enlisted men's rag." Analysis reveals that--at least as far as YANK readership preferences are concerned--the GI has similar tastes the world over.

WHAT SOLDIERS LIKE BEST ABOUT *YANK*

To get a line on the YANK features which are most popular with GI's, the following question was put to soldiers in the U.S., ETO, MTOUSA, CPBC, and CBI:

"In general, what things do you like best in Yank magazine? Name two or three particular things."

The table on the facing page lists things about YANK which are most popular with enlisted men. It is apparent from even a cursory glance at the figures that there is a striking similarity between men's tastes in all theaters. Features popular among GI's in Europe are also popular among GI's in the Pacific, and vice versa. In fact, only the U.S. responses show any marked differences, and these differences are largely due to the fact that troops in the States have access to other sources for certain types of home front news.

COMBAT EXPERIENCE HAS LITTLE EFFECT ON READERSHIP PREFERENCE

The similarity in reading tastes described above seems to hold even when men with combat experience are compared with men who have never seen combat. There is only one minor exception to this rule: combat men tend to express stronger preference for certain types of articles which deal with civilian rather than military life.

Again, a man's assignment also seems to have little effect on his reading preferences. There is a tendency for Air Force troops to prefer articles about AAF activities and a similar tendency for Ground Force troops to prefer articles about AGF activities, but neither of these tendencies is very marked.

THE POPULARITY OF *YANK*

While part of YANK's phenomenal sales record may be traced in some instances to a lack of competition from other magazines in some areas, there is no doubt that YANK has managed to anticipate and meet the average GI's likes in a magazine. One conclusion which the survey brings out very strongly is this: YANK enjoys tremendous popularity with GI's everywhere. This conclusion is supported not merely by the fact that the men say they like the magazine. It is supported by the nickels, francs, liras and rupees they plunk down to buy it.

YANK circulation just recently passed the 2 million mark. Three out of every four YANKS sold are bought overseas.
### WHAT SOLDIERS THE WORLD OVER LIKE BEST ABOUT "YANK"

**Question:** "In general, what things do you like best in Yank magazine? Name two or three particular things."

**Percentage of men in each theater mentioning each item...**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ITEM</th>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th>ETO</th>
<th>MTOUSA</th>
<th>CPBC</th>
<th>CBI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Sad Sack</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mail Call</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Stories</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home Front News</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pin-Up Girls</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sport News</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Perhaps the most popular things in YANK are the top-ranking sustained features, such as "The Sad Sack," the "Pin-up Girl," and "Mail Call." As a special part of the survey, cross sections of men in the U.S., ETO, and CPBC were asked to rate various of these features from examples printed in special mock-up issues of YANK.

The almost universal popularity of "The Sad Sack" is revealed when fully 97 percent of the men taking the mock-up preference test endorse it. The "Pin-up Girl" receives the endorsement of almost four out of five readers and "Mail Call" of seven out of ten.

All told, six out of nine sustained features in YANK are favored by a majority of all the men surveyed.
GROUP PUNISHMENT AND REWARD

Source: Study of selected samples of field and company grade officers in the U.S.

Should the group be punished for something one member does? Is it wise leadership to make the whole pay for the sins of the part? Conversely --

Are group rewards effective means of encouraging group action? Specifically, should the officer use the promise of reward to stimulate better performance?

The above questions have long concerned officers—and, for that matter, all personnel involved in leadership. To get a line on how effective group punishment and reward have proved in practice, selected samples of field and company grade officers were questioned on their experiences with the two leadership practices.

As a general rule, most officers do not recommend the use of group punishment except in rare instances. Among these instances are:

1. Instances where group responsibility may be involved, such as flunking inspections, wholesale overstaying of passes, mounting VD rates, etc.

2. Instances where group pressure seems called for and where the men recognize that their own interests are at stake, as in thievery, drunkenness, etc.

Instances involving group responsibility

The following comments are selected from a number of similar comments made by those officers who feel that group punishment can prove successful as a remedial measure:

"One squad failed to prepare its barracks for inspection to be had the following day. Result—no passes that night to the whole company. The rest of the company saw to it that the deficient squad never did that again." (Major)

"In Italy one squadron's VD rate increased. Entire squadron was restricted on every new case. Rate went to zero and other squadrons took notice. Group punishment is not good except on special occasions." (Major)

Instances calling for group pressure

Thievery always confronts the officer with a nasty command problem. To leave the thief unapprehended is to encourage more stealing. At the same time, it is often extremely difficult to find the offender. In such instances, group pressure—encouraged through group punishment—has often proved an effective means of clearing up the trouble.

"In several cases of thievery. A company was informed it would be restricted until the thief was found. He was found in each case. The men soon determined that there would be no more thievery. There was not." (Lt. Col.)

Closely akin to the thievery problem, in that group pressure often clears it up, is drunkenness within the command.

"Drunkenness in company—- inability to get testimony—- restrictions on whole unit caused men to correct offenders." (Major)

As the chart on the following page shows, almost three officers in five say they think group punishment "is never a good idea." These officers base their objections on reasons such as the following:
1. It is an undemocratic way to solve leadership difficulties.

2. It boomerangs, because the innocent men lose heart if punished for misdemeanors of others.

3. It is seldom or never a popular practice with the men themselves.

In backing their opinions, many of the officers cite cases from their own experience to prove the ineffectiveness of group punishment.

"Entire company was restricted to company street for weekend because one (1) man had a dirty canteen. Rest of company had excellent equipment—admitted by Executive Officer. In a short time after that no one bothered to clean their equipment—reasoning why work to clean up when you'll be restricted anyway." (1st Lt.)

"Man wrote some wise cracks on company bulletin board. When company was questioned neither the culprit nor anyone in the company would say who did it. Company was kept in company street for two straight weeks. Results: a very unpopular CO, low morale, person was never identified." (Capt.)

As can be judged from the findings presented here, there are no hard and fast suggestions that can be made about using group punishment. It works for some officers sometimes. Other officers want no part of it.

Its effectiveness as a leadership practice will always depend on the individual situation. An officer who has established excellent rapport with his men may be able to use more extreme measures to get leadership results than one who has still to win the confidence of his command. Experience will indicate whether or not group punishment has worked in the past—and therefor whether it promises to work in the future.

A Regimental Commander sums the whole issue up excellently when he says:

"If a group is anxious to become outstanding, yet it has a few '8 balls' in it—the group will attempt to control these 8 balls more effectively if its general standing is lowered by them as punishment. Yet I admit that such a procedure is harmful to the morale of the soldiers and officers really trying."

"To maintain discipline, it is almost necessary to have group punishment, otherwise the ones who don't care will not be controlled by the ones who do care for the high standing of the unit."

**Group Reward**

In direct contrast with the split of officer opinion on the question of group punishment is the almost universal agreement on the question of group reward. With few dissenters, officers of both field and company grade say that the

**WHAT ABOUT GROUP PUNISHMENT?**

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**Group Reward**

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promise of extra reward often works wonders in getting more—and better—work out of men.

At the same time, however, group reward is not recommended as a common leadership practice. Officers tend to feel that it has a special place in the scheme of things and should therefore be used rather sparingly to get maximum results.

The two most common types of reward employed by officers seem to be some form of time-off (free-time, passes) and some form of special recreation (parties, "beer busts" and the like).

Some indication of types of cases where rewards have worked well in practice can be gathered from a few comments selected from the many offered by officers:

"Special pass privileges were to be given for highest score on the obstacle course. Our company was given a rating of 99%. It worked out very well and aroused the feeling of appreciation for a job well done." (1st Lt.)

"Men promised 'beer bust' if road was completed within time limit. Men worked harder and were grateful of chance. Warning: Always keep such a promise!" (2nd Lt.)

The warning sounded by the officer just quoted is repeated by many officers: Never promise an outfit a reward for getting out a "pressure" job unless you are sure of fulfilling that promise.

An example of what happens to morale when promises are not kept is cited by a Flight Surgeon: (Lt. Col.)

"...told all airmen that after 25 missions they'd come home. (He was wrong.) At the end of 35 missions the same promise. (Again he was wrong.) Repeated at 50 missions. It worked. Morale highly elevated but a new order cancelled rotation. Morale went way down rapidly."

Source: Studies of selected samples of officers (field and company grade) and of enlisted men in the U.S.

There is a common feeling in the American Army that a certain amount of griping is to be expected, that, in fact, even the well-adjusted and contented GI will grouse now and then.

Without question, a good share of GI griping is simply so much blown-off steam. At the same time, though, some of the griping enlisted men do arise from deep-seated resentments against certain of the less happy aspects of their Army careers.

That many officers are in sympathy with some of the more common of enlisted men's gripes is evident from the results of a study completed recently among samples of field-grade and company-grade officers and enlisted men in the U. S.

Just how much of their sympathy may relate to an unconscious reflection of their own gripes is, of course, impossible to determine.

Gripes—Justified and Otherwise

It is not altogether surprising that when enlisted men are confronted with a list of eight subjects enlisted men commonly gripe about, a majority of them say that fully six of the gripes are usually justified. It is significant that a majority of officers also agree that four out of eight gripes are usually justified. (See chart opposite.)

In several of the "gripe" areas there is almost complete agreement between officers and enlisted men that the latter's gripes are usually justified.
ED MEN’S GRIPES ARE JUSTIFIED?

For example, fully two-thirds of both the officers and the enlisted men questioned agree that gripes on the subject of frozen or too-slow promotions usually make sense. There is substantially the same sort of agreement on men's griping about "wrong job assignments." And on the question of "too much time wasted during the day," officers are even more prone than enlisted men to say that gripping is usually justified.

If there is strong agreement on the above-mentioned gripes, there is equally strong disagreement between officers and enlisted men on several others.

Thus, while more than half the enlisted men name the following gripes as usually justified --
"Not enough passes and furloughs"
"The wrong men get the breaks"
"Discipline too strict about petty things"

--only about one-fourth of the officers agree.

INDIVIDUAL SIMILARITIES—AND DIFFERENCES

A detailed analysis of officers' and enlisted men's opinions was made to see if there are any significant variations in the feelings of different kinds of personnel on the above questions.

The analysis reveals a striking similarity in the pattern of officers' and enlisted men's responses, regardless of such factors as overseas service, length of service, rank, type of commission held by officers, education and Force to which assigned.

On the other hand, certain interesting differences exist between types of enlisted men on the justification of some of the gripes. Returnee EM, for example, are more likely to say griping about job assignments and furloughs is justified than are non-returnees. And better educated men are more likely to view griping about promotions, assignment, petty discipline and wasted time as reasonable and less likely to feel that griping about work load is justified.

WHAT CAN THE OFFICER DO ABOUT IT?

The pattern of officers' and men's responses charted on the preceding page is, in a sense, an endorsement of the fact that some of the more common of enlisted men's gripes are often based on real causes. Certainly this foundation in fact can be assumed in the case of gripes which a majority of officers themselves find usually justified.

There is much in the findings reported here that can serve as a guide to the company officer in his dealings with troops. To begin with, some of the things men commonly gripe about fall within the area of matters he himself can improve by taking corrective action.

Enlisted men and officers agree that "too much time is wasted during the day" in many instances. While the Company Commander does not outline the training or working program, he does administer it. As an administrator he can do his best to see that the workload is spread out equitably among the men throughout the day. He can also see to it that the "hurry up and wait" bugaboo which troubles most GI's is eliminated by careful planning in advance.

Other gripes can be given the same common sense treatment. The job assignment problem—while in large measure a product of the limited number of jobs available in any given outfit—can be attacked by carefully reviewing the qualifications of all the men in the outfit and making assignments on the basis of men's backgrounds and abilities.

Similarly, there can be an equitable distribution of passes and furloughs to show all men that their officers are doing their utmost to give them every break even if the total number of passes and furloughs available is not ideal.

By and large, all the average GI asks is fair and equitable treatment. He will put up with a good deal without complaint if he is sure that his officers are doing all in their power to look after his welfare and treat him like a man.

Commanding officers are, of course, anxious to make their organizations efficient and satisfied. When actions or restrictions which are likely to cause grumbling are necessary, there should be a good reason for them. Explaining this reason to the men will go far to change their attitudes and reduce dissatisfaction. Even in cases where security prevents giving the reason, men will respond well to this explanation if previous practice has built up confidence that the command normally has good reasons for unpopular actions and explains those reasons when possible.
LIMITED ASSIGNMENT MEN OVERSEAS

Source: Cross-section survey of two battalions of limited assignment men at a replacement depot overseas.

Somewhere along the trail from the hospital to his new job, the overseas soldier who is reclassified as "limited assignment" is likely to develop an unhealthy outlook on his future role in the theater.

His attitudes are, in a sense, a preview of the attitudes to be anticipated among LA men in Europe after V-E Day. Undoubtedly many such men are going to be retained overseas after victory in Europe because redeployment needs for moving men to the Pacific will make their retention necessary. Making maximum use of LA personnel will call for leadership which can meet and solve problems such as those discussed in this report.

Surveyed at a replacement depot where they were awaiting reassignment, three out of five limited assignment men felt that they should be returned to the States rather than be kept overseas in a rear echelon unit. Only one out of three could see the need for holding LA men in the theater.

In all probability these men will take along to their new outfits the attitude that they should have been sent back to the U. S. For their officers, this type of thinking may spell a headache—potentially a sour note in the working harmony of the whole organization.

To understand the frame of mind of limited assignment personnel toward further overseas duty, the following are some of the factors to be considered.

In the face of wide publicity about manpower shortages in the theater and on the home front, many of these men find themselves sitting around replacement depots for long periods of time and view themselves as being shoved around from one depot to another:

33 percent of the men said they had been released from the hospital fully a month or two previously; another 19 percent said they had been out for three months or more without receiving an assignment.

Further, almost half the men report being shifted to three or more different replacement depots since leaving the hospital.

Administrative problems involved in the transition from general service to limited assignment are no doubt responsible for much of the delay in placement of these men. But most LA men ignore these difficulties and seize upon the lag in their assignment as a sign that there is no real need for their services overseas.

The "forgotten man" feeling to which LA men are prey is reflected in this typical comment:

"Many LA men are sent from one depot to another and never seem to get assigned. Most of us are just hanging around doing no good. If they can't be
placed by the Army in a reasonable time, send them back to the States to work in some job where they will be helping the war."

**IMPORTANCE OF ORIENTING THE MEN**

There is a common feeling among limited assignment men that the Army has no real concern about them, that they are merely floaters. This feeling is aggravated by the fact that most of them seem to have little idea of what disposition is going to be made of them.

When questioned, fully two out of three LA men felt that they had not "been told as much as possible" about the types of assignment for which they were slated. "They could have told us a lot more," these men say.

The importance of giving limited assignment personnel a clear picture of the job ahead for them is strikingly revealed in the findings charted below. Men who have been told the whole story are much more likely to feel they are needed overseas than are men who have not been fully oriented on their coming assignments.

In many cases limited assignment men will report to their new units in a skeptical mood about their chances of landing a job which they are qualified to handle. Less than two-fifths of the soldiers reclassified as unfit for further general duty believe that most LA men are getting assignments well suited to them. Unless it gets careful attention, this skepticism may develop into a "chip-on-the-shoulder" approach toward their new duties which would make proper job attitudes harder to build.

**NOTE: TO OFFICERS**

In dealing with these men, it should be remembered that most of them have been through severe battle experiences. Almost half of those surveyed indicate they were marked LA because of combat exhaustion.

In the light of the ever growing use which is being made of LA men in their overseas theaters—and the fact that large numbers of them will necessarily be retained overseas immediately following V-E Day—limited assignment personnel represent a valuable source of manpower.

The company officer has several weapons to combat the undesirable attitudes such men may bring with them from replacement depots. By fitting them whenever possible to jobs appropriate to their capacities and by orienting them on the continued need for their services in the theater, the CO can help convert LA men into useful well-adjusted members of his organization.

**IMPORTANCE OF TELLING THE MEN ABOUT THEIR JOB STATUS**

Among men who say they have been told the whole story about their job status...

FIVE OUT OF TEN are convinced of the need for their services overseas.

Among men who say they have not been told the whole story about their job status...

fewer than THREE OUT OF TEN are convinced of the need for their services overseas.
REACTIONS TO THE ARMY EDUCATION PROGRAM

Overseas EM are enthusiastic about Post-VE classes—but with reservations

Source: Studies of selected samples of enlisted men in two overseas theaters.

The Army Education Program is designed to get under way after victory in Europe. Because re-deployment needs for the war against Japan will have No. 1 priority after Germany falls, it is impossible to estimate at the present time just how many men will be given the opportunity to participate in the AEP.

Previous surveys of men’s opinions about the AEP in two overseas areas point out, however, that wherever the AEP does go into operation, it will be backed by a large reservoir of interest among enlisted men. Unit officers upon whom much of the responsibility for making a success of the program will fall, need have no fear that their men will be apathetic to the program.

As planned, the basic element in the GI educational project will be the battalion-level school. Officers of the lower echelons will be given the all-important job of putting AEP across by locating the most competent instructors available and seeing to it that the training offered is of maximum benefit to the troops enrolled.

RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE PROGRAM

The importance of the unit officer’s function is underlined by the comments of men who express serious doubts about the way the program will work out. One of the leading reasons men give for such skepticism is that the schools will not measure up to their standards.

A considerable proportion of soldiers are also doubtful about the value of instruction which could be offered within

QUESTION: "How interested would you personally be in taking courses in the Army Education Program after the fighting is over?"

AMONG EVERY 20 MEN—*

8 say "very much interested"

8 say "fairly interested"

4 say "not much" or "not interested at all"

*From a sample of Air Force ground personnel. Other samples ranged from about 60 to 80 percent of the men indicating interest in the program.
MEN NEED TO BE TOLD AEP WILL NOT DELAY THEIR RETURN

QUESTION: "Do you think that men who take part in any Army Education Program are likely to be kept overseas any longer than men who do not take part in it?"

Percent who say....

NO, I don't think they will be kept longer

48%

UNDECIDED, No answer

36%

YES, I think they are likely to be kept longer

16%

How interest in program is related to views on whether participation means delay in return to U.S.

Percentage NOT INTERESTED in program among men who think courses,....

Would not delay their return

16%

Undecided

23%

Are likely to delay return

36%

"That's the way the Army works"..."it never keeps its promises"..."you never can tell what the Army will do"...etc.

Another one-fourth of these men seem to feel that soldiers not engaged in any activities would be the first to be returned, on the theory that those whose time is occupied with courses will be more or less forgotten when the shipment lists are made up.

Lack of faith in the Army's pledges in this connection definitely tends to influence men's decisions about taking AEP courses:

Among men who believe that their trip back to the U.S. would not be put off by reason of the program, only 16 percent say they are not interested in taking AEP courses. But--

Fully 38 percent of the men who feel that their return would be delayed say they are not interested in the program.

Rooting out this hard-to-kill attitude with straightforward information will therefore have to be one of the first steps in activating the Army Education Program for overseas troops.

One of the most serious obstacles to support of the Army Education Program is the fear voiced by enlisted men that participation might delay their return to the States. In one survey the men were given explicit assurance, prior to filling out questionnaires, that their shipment home would in no way be held up by enrollment in the courses. Despite this explanation, less than half expressed confidence that no strings of this type would be attached to participation in AEP. The remainder were uncertain or clung to the opinion that if they signed up for classes it would definitely postpone their departure from the theater.

Of the men who display the latter attitude, about half justify their answers in terms of general distrust of the Army:
WHEN THE INFANTRYMAN RETURNS

Source: Studies of selected samples of ZI* troops and Infantry returnees assigned to Infantry and two ASF branches.

For the past year or so there has been a steady flow of Infantrymen returning to the States for reassignment after strenuous tours of duty overseas. The big majority of these men are combat veterans, many of whom have been returned home as unfit for further general duty overseas.

Typically, Infantry returnees are now getting -- and in all probability will continue to get -- one of two assignments: to Infantry training outfits (usually IRTC's) or to ASF outfits. The returnee attitudes reported here provide a preview of the attitudes future Infantry returnees will bring with them.

Ordinarily, any GI who is transferred to a new outfit after considerable service in another, has a difficult adjustment to make. He is, in a sense, a stranger. Before he can really feel that he "belongs" he has to share in that group feeling that spells pride in outfit.

Such adjustment is particularly difficult in the case of the returnee Infantryman for several reasons. His combat experience and his tendency to feel he is in bad shape generally are complicating factors. So, too, is his feeling that he doesn't get along well with ZI troops in his new outfit and that ZI soldiers get the best breaks on job assignment. The following findings are pertinent in these respects.

1. Many of the returned Infantrymen have been returned for physical reasons: as hospital patients, for nervousness, or on PLA orders (13% of those assigned to Infantry and 63% of those assigned to ASF branches fall in this category).

2. Many are classified as unfit for further overseas duty (22% of those as-

*ZI, where used in this report refers to men who have never been overseas.

### THE INFANTRY RETURNEE IS A STRANGER IN HIS NEW OUTFIT

**He hasn't been around long...**

QUESTION: "How long have you been in your present company?"

**Percentage saying three months or less...**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-Returnee Infantrymen</th>
<th>16</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infantry Returnees in Infantry Outfits</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry Returnees in ASF Outfits</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**He doesn't feel he belongs...**

QUESTION: "Do you feel you really belong in your company and are an important part of it?"

**Percentage saying no...**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-Returnee Infantrymen</th>
<th>34%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infantry Returnees in Infantry Outfits</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry Returnees in ASF Outfits</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. Over a third of the returnees assigned to Infantry and almost three-fourths of those assigned to ASF think they are in poor physical condition.

4. Half of the men in the Infantry group and fully three-fourths of the men in the ASF group feel they have already done their share in the war and should be discharged.

5. Finally, their relationship with ZI troops in their new outfits are far from what they should be.

**RELATIONS WITH ZI TROOPS**

One of the indices of the returnee's level of adjustment in the States is how well he gets along with the ZI men in his new outfit. A substantial proportion of Infantry returnees feel that returnees and ZI men do not get along well and there is evidence of a certain amount of resentment against ZI troops. For example:

Asked how well returnees and ZI men get along together, the men replied as follows:

- 19% of the returnees in Infantry say they do not get along well.
- 28% of the returnees in ASF say they do not get along well.

There is a tendency among many returnees to feel that ZI men get the breaks when it comes to better jobs. This feeling is reflected in the following:

- 26% of the returnees in Infantry say ZI men get the better jobs.
- 57% of the returnees in ASF say ZI men get the better jobs.

**OTHER SPECIAL PROBLEMS**

Infantry returnees assigned to Infantry units in the United States usually wind up in IRTC's, most of which are in the West or South. As a result of this geographical concentration of IRTC camps, these men are often stationed long distances from home -- so far, in fact, that getting home on a three-day pass is impossible for most of them.

Almost half of these returnees in Infantry outfits are stationed more than 36 hours from home, thus necessitating fully three days of traveling to get home and back. This compares with about a quarter of ZI troops and a fifth of Infantry returnees in ASF who are more than 36 hours from home.

**RETURNEE NOT A ROOKIE**

Finally, the Infantry returnee is quick to resent any indication that he is being treated as a "greenhorn" or rookie in his new outfit. This is only reasonable in the light of the time he has put into Army service -- both in the States and overseas.

Two-thirds of the Infantry returnees assigned to Infantry and three-fifths of the Infantry returnees in ASF have been in the Army over 3 years. This compares with only one-sixteenth of ZI troops who have been in that long. The returnee may be a newcomer -- but he is anything but a rookie.

It is significant that almost half the returnees in Infantry and almost two-thirds of the returnees in ASF say that full use is not now being made of their skill and experience.

Helping the Infantry veteran adjust to his assignment in the States is a difficult job -- for reasons such as the ones outlined above -- but it is a job that must be done. Officers who take cognizance of the special problems of Infantry returnees in their outfit and show these men every consideration -- particularly during the early period when they are "strangers" -- will be rewarded in terms of getting whole-hearted work out of trained, veteran soldiers.
The articles in this bulletin are based on attitude surveys conducted by the Research Branch, Information and Education Division, and the research units reporting to the commanding generals of the several theaters.

The staff of the Research Branch is composed of Army officers who are experienced in the field of surveys, together with a number of civilian specialists. Techniques have been developed, tested and adjusted to fit the Army's problems.

The basic steps in conducting a study are as follows:

1. The questionnaire is prepared in consultation with the War Department branches, or the theater command immediately concerned. Questions are carefully chosen to provide the exact type of information desired.

2. The questionnaire is pre-tested. That is, the questions are tried out on small groups of men to determine whether they are meaningful and understandable to the type of men or officers to be studied.

3. The project is cleared for action with the commands in which the study is to be made.

4. The number of men to be surveyed is set sufficiently large to insure statistically reliable findings.

5. The men to be surveyed are selected to insure as true a cross section of the group to be studied as possible. A cross section of enlisted men in the United States, for example, is so drawn as to give proper proportionate representation to each branch of the Army, to men in each stage of training, and to men stationed in the various sections of the country. It is, of course, possible to get cross sections of a single branch, of a division, of Negro troops, or any other portion of the Army desired.

6. The men complete questionnaires under conditions of absolute anonymity. They are assembled in small groups, and hear a short introduction given by a specially trained class leader. This introduction makes it clear to the men that only their frank opinion is wanted, and that they are not being tested or spied on. No names or serial numbers are placed on the questionnaires. Ordinarily, illiterates or men of very low intelligence are interviewed by specially trained enlisted men.

7. The data are analyzed by specialists in attitude research analysis. Reports of these analysts are released to agencies concerned, and also form the basis for the material presented in this bulletin.

The procedure outlined above is that followed in the typical cross section survey. Other techniques, of course, are employed from time to time in special situations.