WHAT THE SOLDIER THINKS
A Monthly Digest of War Department Studies on the Attitudes of American Troops

SOME IDEAS FOR INCREASING PRIDE IN OUTFIT

COMBAT MEN'S WINTER CLOTHING PREFERENCES

WHAT AAF RETURNES THINK ABOUT GARRISON LIFE

LEADERSHIP AND NEGRO TROOPS

TREATMENT ABOARD TROOP SHIPS

SOLDIERS' POST-WAR EMPLOYMENT PLANS

WHAT NEW INDUCTEES THINK OF THE INFANTRY

SPECIAL ORIENTATION FOR OVERSEAS HOSPITAL PATIENTS

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SOME IDEAS FOR INCREASING PRIDE IN OUTFIT

"Telling the folks back home" is a favored method of building men's pride in their unit.

Building pride in outfit has long been recognized as one of the key functions of command—particularly on the company level.

Research studies and command experience have borne out the fact that pride in outfit must be built from the ground up and that it is inextricably connected with leadership. High unit pride is built on a foundation of men's confidence in and respect for their officers. There is no substitute for such a foundation.

Once the above prerequisites for pride in outfit are established, however, that pride can be heightened by various methods. Higher command has long recognized this fact and several methods have been employed with the specific purpose of raising men's pride in outfit.

A theater-wide study of enlisted men in one overseas area casts a good deal of light on the subject of what pride-building methods men think work best.

As the chart below indicates, the men choose "Stories about the outfit in magazines and papers back home" as the single best pride-booster among all the methods listed. In fact, twice as many men choose that method as choose any other single pride-builder.
Men's endorsements of "stateside" publicity as a means of building pride in outfit reflects the weight they tend to give to "telling the folks back home" about what they are doing overseas.

It is characteristic of the GI to want recognition for himself as an individual. Such recognition is a highly-motivating kind of reward for the job he does. When that job is being done far from home and under trying conditions, it is only natural that the desire for reward in the form of publicity tends to increase.

The ideal publicity program is one that satisfies the individual recognition desires of all soldiers. But a publicity program which plays up activities of units is the next best thing. Such a program can often be carried out--without putting too heavy a burden on unit personnel.

**TELLING THE FOLKS BACK HOME**

Whenever possible, the alert company officer will do well to see that news about the activities of his outfit gets into the hands of Army Public Relations. From that channel, the news can be distributed to newspapers and magazines back home.

In addition, any unit which carries on a regular policy of submitting through channels information about its activities stands a chance of increasing the number of mentions it gets in home publications.

As a final point, any publicity an outfit gets in either the home or Theater press should be clipped out and posted where all the men can see it.

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**COMBAT MEN’S WINTER CLOTHING PREFERENCES**

Source: Studies at the front of cross sections of officers and enlisted men in several Infantry divisions, and one Armored division in a combat theater.

Experienced combat soldiers agree that winter fighting is extremely tough fighting. The wet and cold of winter field conditions confront them with an enemy as formidable to men and vehicles as the German across the line.

But winter cold and wet can be licked by protective clothing. To help the Quartermaster Corps provide the winter clothing our combat men want, research teams went up front to find the answer.

The men were asked about their preferences in jacket and jacket combinations, in sweaters, in trousers, shoes and other clothing. The findings in the opposite column show how their preferences were distributed:

1. Almost all the men expressed preferences for a combination of upper garments rather than a single jacket or mackinaw. (Favorite upper garment combination: combat jacket with high-neck sweater.)

2. Almost every soldier questioned had worn a sweater in combat, and most of them had worn the sweater, high neck. The latter item was endorsed by fully nine-tenths of the men for winter wear.

3. Most popular trouser combination was winter combat trousers worn over OD trousers. This combination was especially popular with Armored division troops. (Four men in five chose the combination among Armored troops as compared with half the men among Infantry troops.)

4. Among other items for which men expressed preference were mitten-type gloves with trigger finger, hoods, and wool scarfs.
WHAT AAF RETURNEES THINK ABOUT GARRISON LIFE

Source: Studies of samples of AAF bomber crew and non-flying enlisted men from various overseas theaters.

Even in a normal Z of I training camp situation, a large proportion of enlisted men complain about certain disciplinary and restrictive aspects of garrison life.

Bitterness about what EM consider "galling" aspects of garrison life seems to be much more prevalent among soldiers who have returned to the States from overseas than it is among soldiers who have never seen overseas service.

This fact is reflected in surveys of the attitudes of returned AAF personnel. In these surveys the returnees complain about garrison discipline and restrictions despite the fact that they tend to be well satisfied with their new assignments and look favorably on their present Army set-up.

NOTE: The figures quoted through the balance of this report are for relatively normal and well adjusted troops only. In every case, the opinions of soldiers with high psychoneurotic symptoms were not considered. Thus it is evident that few if any "chronic grippers" are represented in the sample.

SOME FOCAL POINTS FOR COMPLAINT

Aspects of garrison life which seem to plague returnees most severely include the following:

1. Too strict or unnecessary military control and discipline.
2. Officers' lack of concern for enlisted men's welfare.
3. Officer privileges.

MILITARY CONTROL AND DISCIPLINE

The gist of men's complaints about military control and discipline is that it is "too strict" and "a lot of it is unnecessary."

| QUESTION: "What do you think of the military control and discipline at this post?"
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage saying, &quot;It's too strict and a lot of it is unnecessary...&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<th>BOMBER CREWS</th>
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<tr>
<td>Returnees</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-overseas Men</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>NON-FLYERS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Returnees</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-overseas Men</td>
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OFFICERS' CONCERN FOR MEN'S WELFARE

Previous research studies have borne out that one of the key leadership practices is showing concern for the welfare of enlisted men. It is essential that such concern be dramatized, that the men recognize it. For if an officer has his men's welfare at heart—but the men do not appreciate the fact—the resulting
morale situation is just as serious as if the officer had no concern at all for his men.

As might be expected, non-flying AAF men are more likely than flying personnel to say that few or none of their officers look out for their welfare. At the same time, however, returnee personnel of both types are a long way from giving their officers a clean bill of health in the matter. It is interesting to note that on this question, the attitudes of Z of I men—though more favorable than those of returnees—are also in need of improvement.

**QUESTION:** "How many of your present officers are the kind that always try to look out for the welfare of enlisted men?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage saying &quot;few&quot; or &quot;none&quot;.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BOMBER CREWS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returnees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-overs seas Men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(EACH SYMBOL = 10%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NON-FLYERS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returnees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-overs seas Men</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Perhaps one of the clues to the attitudes toward officers expressed by returnees is their preference for officers who are returnees themselves. When interviewed, only about a third of the returnees said that the C.O. of their squadron had served overseas. At the same time, an overwhelming majority of them indicated that they would prefer officers who are overseas veterans (92% of the bomber crew returnees and 82% of the non-flying returnees).

**OFFICER PRIVILEGES**

Closely allied with men's feelings about officers' concern for their welfare is their feeling on the question of officer privileges. Enlisted men in the AAF often tend to be especially sensitive about this matter, if only because so many of their flying officers are younger than they are themselves—younger and seemingly less mature.

Bomber crew enlisted men, whether returnees or Z of I, are much more likely to resent the privileges officers get than are enlisted men who do not fly. Again, this fact probably ties in with the extreme youth of flying officers as compared with the gunners who fly with them.

Typical of men's feeling on the subject is the following:

"The enlisted men here have to be off the streets at midnight due to curfew, while officers who aren't old enough to drink legally stay out all night."

**THE UNIT OFFICER'S PROBLEM**

The squadron officer who commands an outfit with a heavy loading of returnees is likely to be on the spot—especially if he has not been overseas himself. Recognizing that fact, there is much he can do to win the respect and wholehearted cooperation of his men—ZI and returnee alike.

If the returnee tends to expect special recognition for his extra experience, he is entitled to it. That does not mean that he should be babied. But, in the light of the "plus" he often has to offer his outfit, the wise officer will want to show him every consideration.
LEADERSHIP AND NEGRO TROOPS
The morale of soldiers—colored or white—can be built or broken
on the company level

Source: Study of all available enlisted men in a Negro Quartermaster Service Battalion in an overseas theater.

That all troops—whatever their backgrounds, whatever their branch or assignment—respond to effective leadership is one of the axioms of command. Now an intensive study of all available enlisted men in the three companies of a Negro QM Service Battalion working overseas demonstrates that effective leadership is a morale-builder among Negro troops just as surely as it is among white troops.

The battalion studied is mainly engaged in dock work, loading and unloading ships at an important port in the Pacific. The three companies in the battalion each do similar work, for the same number of hours, and under the same leadership at the battalion level.

Despite all these similarities, the study shows that there are vast differences between the outfits in various morale areas. The charts throughout this report show how striking these differences are. It will be noted that Company X is consistently low on all the items charted, and that Company Z is consistently high, with Company Y usually making a creditable showing. Since the companies have the same battalion level leadership, it is apparent that the differences can be traced directly to leadership differences on the company level.

COMPANY LEADERSHIP AND MORALE

One of the keys to effective command on the company level is taking a personal interest in the men. In leading Negro troops, this personal interest is an especially crucial matter, for Negro troops often feel—because of their previous experience with white people generally—that their white officers are not really concerned about their welfare. Once they are convinced that their officers have this personal interest in their welfare, that conviction has a beneficial effect on their morale and on their performance.

In the battalion studied, the companies varied widely in the percentage of men in each saying they think their officers take a personal interest in them:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERSONAL INTEREST</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>QUESTION: “How many of your company officers take a personal interest in their men?”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERCENTAGE SAYING &quot;ALL&quot; OR &quot;MOST&quot; OF THEM DO...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMPANY X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMPANY Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMPANY Z</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

WHAT "PERSONAL INTEREST" INVOLVES

When personal interest in the welfare of enlisted men is translated into action, it results in leadership practices like the following:

1. Knowing the men's ability, backgrounds, what they can do;

2. Being sensitive to any injustices in giving rewards, such as promotions;

3. Providing interesting off-duty activities for the men.
Examination of men's responses on each of the points above demonstrates that there are wide variations between the three companies in the percentage of men endorsing their officers' efforts in their behalf. In each instance, Company X, in which only 10 percent of the men say their officers are personally interested in them, scores far lower than the other two companies.

KNOWING THE MEN

QUESTION: "Do you feel that your company officers know what you are able to do?"

PERCENTAGE SAYING OFFICERS HAVE "SOME IDEA" OR "A GOOD IDEA"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMPANY</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Z</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PROMOTION, SELECTION OF NON-COMS

QUESTION: "How many of the non-coms in your company handle their jobs as well as anyone else that could be picked from your company?"

PERCENTAGE SAYING "ALL" OR "MOST" OF THEM DO...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMPANY</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Z</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OFF-DUTY ACTIVITIES

QUESTION: "Could your company officers do more than they are doing to give you interesting and worthwhile things to do in your off-duty free time?"

PERCENTAGE SAYING "THEY DO ALL THEY CAN NOW."...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMPANY</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Z</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

THE "PAY OFF" -- IN ZEAL AND MORALE

When officers take a personal interest in their men--and demonstrate that interest by the leadership practices just described--it pays off in terms of increased zeal and higher morale. The men work harder; they are in far better shape mentally.

In the battalion studied, there is a clear demonstration of the above fact. The men in Company X tend to rate the zeal of their outfit low, at the same time that the men in Company Z tend to rate the zeal of their outfit as high. The same trend is apparent when the men in the three companies are asked to rate their outfit's morale.

ZEAL

QUESTION: "Would you say that most of the men in your outfit usually put all they have into their Army duties, or do they usually work just hard enough to get by?"

PERCENTAGE SAYING "MOST OF THE MEN USUALLY PUT ALL THEY HAVE INTO IT"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMPANY</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Z</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

QUESTION: "How about yourself -- would you honestly say that you usually put all you have into your Army duties, or do you usually work just hard enough to get by"...

PERCENTAGE SAYING "I USUALLY PUT ALL I HAVE INTO IT"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMPANY</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Z</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Morale

Asked to rate the morale of the men in their outfit, the companies respond as follows:

64% of the EM in Company X say the morale of the men in their outfit is low. This compares with:

37% of the EM in Company Y who say the same and only

33% of the EM in Company Z who say the morale of the men in their outfit is low.

Much the same contrast is apparent when the men in the three companies are asked to rate their own morale.

COMMAND OF NEGRO TROOPS

While good leadership follows the same basic outlines for both white and Negro troops, for the latter it sometimes calls for special adjustments to meet special needs. For example, Negro soldiers tend to be lower than white soldiers in AGCT scores, education, and on certain attitudes related to the war. Effective command of Negro troops demands that these factors be given consideration.

The attention of all officers concerned with Negro soldiers is called to WD Pamphlet 20-6, COMMAND OF NEGRO TROOPS, which explains the special problems of colored soldiers and outlines a program of Negro troop leadership.

Quoting from the pamphlet: "The War Department desires that Negro soldiers be used in the most effective manner. It intends that men of all races and national origins be encouraged and stimulated to do anything done by members of any other group in accordance with their individual abilities."

That is the goal of Negro troop leadership. To achieve it is to aid in the building of a better, more effective fighting and working Army.

TREATMENT ABOARD TROOP SHIPS

It is common knowledge that the conditions under which men have been shipped overseas in troop ships have been far from ideal.

Over-all, however, a majority of men recently questioned on their treatment while traveling on troop ships seem to feel that conditions are not too bad under the circumstances. Their feeling can be summarized as follows: Could be better, of course, but conditions make it tough to improve matters.

The men had traveled on troop ships to and from various overseas areas. They had just returned to the States on such ships and were asked: "What is your opinion of the treatment men get on board troop ships?"

The following table shows what they think of treatment on board ship.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 18%        | "It is very good."
| 36%        | "It is pretty good."
| 20%        | "It is not so good."
| 15%        | "It is very poor."
| 11%        | Give no answer. |

A common remark is that conditions were much better on the trip coming home than they were going over. Whether this improvement is actual or simply comes from the men's elation at returning to the States cannot be determined.

As might be expected, men rating treatment on board ships as bad, criticize such matters as preferential treatment given officers, getting only two meals a day, and the severe crowding and poor ventilation.
The typical soldier fights and works with an eye toward the future. Even if he tries, he cannot possibly keep his mind forever on his main job—winning the war. However engrossed he may be with that all-important job, in the back of his mind he is thinking of the time when he will resume his civilian career.

This fact is apparent when one considers soldiers' own statements about how much thought they have been giving to their post-war plans.

**QUESTION:** "Up to now, how much had you thought about exactly what you will want to do after the war?"

Percentage of men saying...

- Thought a good deal about it... 75%
- Thought some about it... 20%
- Hardly thought about it... 5%

In the broad sense, the officer in command of troops has a double responsibility. He must do all in his power to make them more effective fighting men now. And he must do all in his power to help them prepare to be constructive citizens in the future. That second responsibility cannot possibly be dispatched unless and until the officer knows something of the post-war civilian plans of his men.
There is much the company officer can do to help his men make their post-war job dreams come true

SOLDIERS' POST-WAR JOB PLANS

Within recent months, cross sections of enlisted men in the States and all over the world have been interviewed on the employment plans they have for after the war. The results of these studies are of tremendous importance, of course, to government and private agencies which are now planning economic programs for the post-war period. But they are also of importance to Army command now.

The studies point out that while some soldiers have well-grounded post-war job plans and will thus require very little guidance and assistance to achieve those plans, others are nursing plans which are unrealistic. Men in this latter group will need all the help they can get. Their officers are a logical source of such help.

WHERE ARE MEN'S PLANS UNREALISTIC?

In two of the post-war plan areas in particular there is real danger that men's ambitions lack realism, because they are often not backed by experience and training. Those areas are self-employment areas and they include the one soldier in five who plans definitely or tentatively to go into farming or into business for himself after the war.

Nearly 13 percent of all the enlisted men surveyed say they are "almost sure" they will operate a business or a farm—either by themselves or in partnership—after the war. (An additional six percent are tentatively planning such operations.) These men with self-employment plans are the most logical target for officers' attempts to orient troops on the subject of self-employment.
What kinds of men are included among those who plan to go into business for themselves and who among them are harboring unrealistic plans? The following figures deserve close consideration:

1. Fully one-fifth of the men have had no previous experience either as operators of businesses or as employees in the type of business they plan to enter.

2. Men who have been in the Army for several years are more apt to be planning to go into business than are men with less Army service. (Thus it may be that some men's plans for self-employment stem from a reaction to the regimentation of Army life rather than from a deep-seated, well-thought-out ambition.)

3. If all potential GI businessmen were to go into business after the war, they would create nearly as many new business establishments as the nation lost altogether between September 1941 and September 1943 according to the Department of Commerce. When it is considered that much of the decline in the number of businesses during the war has been caused by operators leaving to take civilian war jobs, it is apparent that the GI post-war businessman is in for some pretty stiff competition which may bankrupt him before he has a chance to get his head above water.

PLANS FOR FARMING

Much the same picture holds for the men who are planning to operate farms after the war, with the exception that the would-be GI farmer nearly always has a farming background.

As with businesses, however, the post-war market may not be able to support all the EM who plan to go into farming for themselves after the war. Good land will be limited; competition may be severe. Some GI's are planning an investment in farming which is too small to pay for the kind of operation they want. Others don't know what kind of farm they will buy or lease. The wartime trend toward fewer, bigger, more efficiently run farms threatens to make it tougher for new farmers to get into farming after the war. Again, advance orientation can show men what to expect in the post-war period and arm them for what is ahead.

WHAT CAN THE OFFICER DO?

While no one assumes that the average company-grade officer is qualified by training or even by temperament to function as a professional vocational guidance expert, this limitation need not hamper him in carrying out his command responsibility in the matter of men's post-war plans. He will find within his command officers and enlisted men who have the necessary training and background to assist him in doing an effective guidance job.

In addition, the Army has made available to all troops a wealth of information—and more important still, actual training and education programs—to assist soldiers in preparing to take up useful careers when the war is won.

HELPING FUTURE BUSINESSMEN

Department of Commerce statistics show that more than half of all new businesses never live to celebrate their first anniversary. This high mortality rate can be blamed on many factors, but the most important single factor is that the men who start them simply do not know enough about the mechanics of operating a business.

Subjects such as bookkeeping, merchandising methods, and business arithmetic can prove immeasurably helpful to the soldier planning a business career after the war. These courses will be available under the Army Education Program after victory in Europe and they are available now by correspondence from the United States Armed Forces Institute.
WHAT NEW INDUCTEES THINK OF THE INFANTRY

Source: Studies of samples of inductees at six reception stations (1945); cross section survey of enlisted men in three Infantry divisions in the U.S. (1944).

In the past year, the role of the Infantry in combat has been getting its just share of praise. The result seems to be that inductees coming into the Army now tend to have healthier attitudes toward Infantry in some respects than did Infantrymen themselves in 1944.

Though many of these recruits do not desire Infantry service, a higher percentage among them hold the Infantry in high respect than among Infantrymen in three divisions surveyed last year.

Particularly significant is the evidence that 1945 inductees are more likely than Infantrymen of a year ago to think that "most people outside of the Army know how important the Infantry is."

Also interesting is the fact that recruits are less likely than Infantrymen of a year ago to think that "the Infantry gets more than its share of men who aren't good for anything else."

When it is considered that a very large proportion of recruits are now being assigned to Infantry, the attitudes reported in the chart below are especially encouraging.

### ATTITUDES TOWARD THE INFANTRY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage of men agreeing with each statement...</th>
<th>1945 RECRUITS</th>
<th>1944 RECRUITS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Soldiers in other branches of the Army have plenty of respect for men in the Infantry.&quot;</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Men in most other branches have a better chance of getting higher ratings than men in the Infantry.&quot;</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;The Infantry gets more than its share of the men who aren't good for anything else.&quot;</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;The Infantry soldier does almost all the real fighting in modern war.&quot;</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;The Infantry has a more dangerous combat job than any other branch.&quot;</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Most people outside the Army know how important the Infantry is.&quot;</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;About all the Infantry can do in modern war is hold the ground which other arms have won.&quot;</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
SPECIAL ORIENTATION FOR OVERSEAS HOSPITAL PATIENTS

Hospitalized EM overseas have special problems which stem from their desire to get home.

Source: Study of enlisted patients in nine hospitals (four General, five Station) in an overseas area.

It has long been recognized that to be maximumly effective, orientation often needs to be adapted to meet the particular needs of particular troops.

In a recent survey among enlisted patients in hospitals in one overseas area it was found, that even though the vast majority of the patients pay high compliments to their doctors and their hospital treatment generally, they still feel that they should be sent to hospitals in the States for treatment.

It goes without saying that nearly every soldier overseas does a good deal of thinking about getting home. Among hospitalized patients, however, this desire to get home tends to get especially intense—so intense, in fact, that the men defend it with all sorts of rationalizations. (See box at right.) The best way to meet and overcome these rationalizations is through a hard-hitting program of orientation.

SOME PERTINENT OVER-ALL FINDINGS

Briefly, the following are the main facts to come out of the study:

Although the great majority of the patients surveyed will be returned to duty in the theater after hospitalization, less than half of them regard this as a proper disposition of their case.

Considerable numbers of patients are inclined to feel that they will no longer be useful to the Army overseas.

There is a tendency for patients to assume that Army hospitals in the U.S. have specialized medical personnel, facilities, and climate which are not available where they are.

In spite of all this, the big majority of patients think highly of the medical treatment they are getting.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>WHY MEN THINK THEY SHOULD BE SENT HOME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>As the chart on the following page shows, almost six men in ten think the doctor in charge of their case should recommend sending them to a hospital in the U.S. Asked why they feel the way they do, the men give the following reasons:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. U.S. climate would help cure me; bones heal faster in the U.S.; better for skin diseases, respiratory complaints, etc; can't get well here . . . . . 23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. I'm unfit for further overseas duty. . 19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Better medical treatment in U.S.; haven't the facilities or personnel to treat me here . . . . . 14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. I won't be fit for duty for a long time . . . . . 13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. I would get well faster close to home. . 11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. I'm not getting any better here, I'm getting worse . . . . . 9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. I've done my share, let the USO commandos come over . . . 6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. All other reasons . . . . . 11%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Percentages add to more than 100 because some men mention more than one reason.)
HOSPITALIZED PATIENTS OVERSEAS PRAISE THEIR MEDICAL SERVICE...

These charts show that hospitalized patients in the overseas area surveyed are warm in their praise of the treatment they are getting in their hospitals. Despite this fact, however, it is evident from the data charted at the bottom of this page that substantial proportions of the patients still think they should be returned to the States for treatment and that they could get even better treatment in Army hospitals on the Mainland.

ATTITUDES TOWARD TREATMENT IN HOSPITALS...

(EACH SYMBOL = 20%)

95 percent of the men say they think the doctor in charge of their case is competent.

75 percent of the men say they think all or most of the doctors in their hospital are really good doctors.

73 percent say they think the medical treatment in their present hospital is at least as good as they could get at a civilian hospital in the U.S.

68 percent of the men say they think the doctors at their hospital take their case seriously enough.

DESPITE ALL THIS -- --

56 percent of the men say they think the doctor in charge of their case should recommend sending them to a hospital in the U.S.; and...

53 percent of the men say they think they would get better treatment than they are now getting if they were sent to an Army hospital in the U.S.
A NOTE ABOUT THE SAMPLE

Included in the survey were the following:

Roughly one-third of the patients interviewed were combat casualties.

Roughly one-third were other surgical patients, not hospitalized for combat wounds.

Roughly one-third were non-surgical or medical cases.

(Fewer than one-twelfth were openward NP cases.)

Omitted from the survey were all patients too badly injured to be interviewed and all patients already marked for return to the States.

Because the survey was made among all types of patients, the attitudes reported here are applicable to all types of patients. Actually, while some of the attitudes are more prevalent among one type of patient than among another, all of the attitudes are common among all types of patients.

SOME GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

In expressing their unfavorable attitudes toward being hospitalized in their overseas theater (in the sense that they would prefer to be hospitalized in the States), the men reveal a real need for orientation and education.

As might be expected, the patients most likely to think they should be returned to the States or even discharged on their release from the hospital are the battle casualties.

On the other hand, the above attitudes are also common to both types of non-combat patients. All these men provide a logical target for orientation and education which aims to show them that—in most instances—they will still be useful to the Army after they recover.

Previous studies among troops in a Pacific area have shown how intense men's feelings tend to get about being kept overseas a long time. In one study, for example, fully three-fourths of the men questioned said they saw no reason why the Army could not send all men home after two years overseas if it really wanted to. A third of them went so far as to agree that this should be done even if it slowed up the war and delayed victory a little.

(Note: For a discussion of men's attitudes toward rotation in several overseas areas, see WHAT THE SOLDIER THINKS, numbers 6 and 9.)

ORIENTATION SUGGESTIONS

Certainly, hospital patients overseas who reflect the above attitudes should be oriented to the true facts in the case:

That they cannot possibly be sent home unless replacements are available; that the war is making greater demands on manpower every day; that, in short, they are needed where they are.

In addition, of course, hospital patients require special orientation designed to meet and overcome their arguments for being treated in U.S. hospitals.

It is apparent from the figures reported here that the overwhelming majority of them endorse the treatment they are getting in hospitals in their own theater and that the reasons they give for wanting to be returned to the U.S. are often rationalized and based more on fiction than fact.

These men cannot be returned to duty at top efficiency unless they are prepared mentally to accept treatment where they are now and further overseas service when they recover. That mental preparation can be accomplished only through an effective orientation program.
KNOWLEDGE OF THE YALTA CONFERENCE

Most men have heard or read of the Big Three conference, though some are hazy about decisions reached there.

Source: Survey of a cross section of enlisted men in the U.S.

The big news in February concerned the Big Three conference held at Yalta in the Russian Crimea. The conference was big news in two important ways: decisions made there outlined plans for sealing the doom of Nazi Germany and for guaranteeing the future peace of Europe after the ETO and MTOUSA phases of the war are won.

In the light of the extreme importance of the conference, it is not surprising to find that among a cross section of enlisted men in the U.S., fully three-fourths said they had heard or read about the conference when questioned late in February. (See chart below.)

FAMILIARITY WITH YALTA "FACTS"

To get a line on how familiar GI's were with the agreements and decisions reached by the Big Three at Yalta, the men were given a quick five-question "multiple choice" test. The results are stated briefly in the adjoining column.

KNOWLEDGE OF THE YALTA CONFERENCE

QUESTION: "Have you heard or read about this (the Yalta) conference?"

Percentage of enlisted men saying...

...Yes 76%
...No 15
...Don't know or no answer 9

...of the men were able to identify three countries represented at the conference.

...of the men knew what the Big Three had decided to do with Germany after the war.

...of the men were familiar with decisions reached about breaking up the German General Staff after victory.

...of the men knew that the conference had agreed to give Poland territory taken from Germany after the war.

...of the men knew that the conference had made no decisions concerning the Pacific phase of the war.

NUMBER OF MEN ORIENTED

More than half of the men questioned had attended orientation meetings in the time between the Yalta conference and the survey. Of these men, about a third had heard the conference discussed at the meetings.

Because the survey was made so soon after the results of the conference were...
announced, it was not practical to attempt to measure the effect of orientation upon men's level of knowledge. It is clear from the present findings, however, that informing men about the conference is a job which deserves to be high on the list of orientation assignments now and in the immediate future.

POST-WAR ATTITUDES -- A COMPARISON

Approximately one year ago, the Research Branch surveyed the opinions of a cross section of enlisted men in the U. S. in some of the same areas covered in the present survey. It is interesting to compare men's responses in the course of the two surveys--particularly in answer to questions concerning prospects for world peace and attitudes toward Russia.

On the question of world peace prospects, there seems to have been no improvement in men's beliefs that there will be no more wars after this one. The figures show that almost half of the enlisted men in the U. S. still feel that there will be another war in the next 25 years and that only one man in five feels there will not be. About a third of the men are still undecided about the question. Clearly this is an area where men need orientation.

On the question of our post-war relations with Russia, however, there seems to have been a significant improvement in men's attitudes. For example:

The percentage of men saying that the U. S. and Russia will "...very likely fight each other sooner or later," drops from 24 percent in the 1944 survey to only 15 percent in the present survey. At the same time --

The percentage of men who say that the U. S. and Russia will either "...get along very well" or "...will disagree about some things but manage to get along" increases from 35 percent in the 1944 survey to 45 percent in the present survey. (See chart at top of next column.)

WILL WE GET ALONG WELL WITH RUSSIA?

QUESTION: "How do you think we will get along with Russia after the war?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage of enlisted men saying...</th>
<th>1944 survey</th>
<th>1945 survey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>We will get along very well.</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We will disagree about some things but manage to get along.</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We will have some serious disagreements but we won't fight each other.</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We will very likely fight each other sooner or later.</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided or no answer.</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A FINAL NOTE

The results reported here emphasize once again that while most soldiers are sufficiently interested in news about important world events to read about these events or listen to radio broadcasts concerning them, they tend to get confused about facts. Surely, a glance at the percentages of men getting the correct answers to the five-question quiz on the Yalta conference will show I & E Officers and all others concerned with information and orientation that much can be done to raise men's level of knowledge on the facts of the conference.

Past experience has shown that when men know the political and economic score about our Allies and the peace, that knowledge tends to be accompanied by the development of proper attitudes. It is precisely such knowledge (plus the excellent showing Russia has made on the battlefield) which is undoubtedly responsible for the improvement in men's attitudes toward the USSR.
TO: Orientation Officers and all others concerned.

SUBJECT: Use of WHAT THE SOLDIER THINKS in the Orientation Program.

I. Research into the attitudes of American soldiers performs two all-important functions: (a) by investigating the factors which affect the morale of troops all over the world, it points out those attitude areas which need strengthening; and (b) either directly or indirectly, it suggests methods for accomplishing that end. Orientation, it will be noted, is one of the most powerful of those methods available to command.

II. The purpose of the Orientation Program is to aid in the development of proper troop attitudes toward the war, current events, our war and peace aims, or enemies and our Allies. Deficiency in one or more of these areas directly affects the mental attitudes of troops.

III. WHAT THE SOLDIER THINKS is a digest of research findings which relate most immediately to command problems, many of which can be solved in whole or in part by better information and orientation. As such, it provides a most useful source of ideas and suggestions for I & E Officers and all other officers concerned with the implementation of the Orientation Program.

IV. A glance at the present issue of WHAT THE SOLDIER THINKS will show how readily it can be adapted to aid in achieving the goals of the Orientation Program: (a) for example, the report beginning on page 1, "Special Orientation for Overseas Hospital Patients," points out how men's desperate desire to get back to the States tends to encourage them to rationalize about the advantages of being treated in the States. Clearly, this is a problem which can be attacked most effectively by orientation; the report recommends the direction such orientation can take. (b) Other reports in the issue also describe attitude areas where soldiers--both at home and overseas--are in need of orientation:

1. The report on "Soldiers' Post-War Employment Plans," beginning on page 8, outlines areas in soldiers' post-war thinking which are unrealistic and outlines a program of orientation designed to set their thinking right.

2. The Air Forces returnee report beginning on page 3 is still another report which describes an area in which troops are in need of orientation and recommends a program which orientation can follow.

3. It will be noted that nearly every report in the present issue discusses attitude problems which can be solved in whole or in part by effective orientation. Future issues will continue to report on such problems.
The articles in this bulletin are based on attitude surveys conducted by the Research Branch, Information and Education Division, and the research units reporting to the commanding generals of the several theaters.

The staff of the Research Branch is composed of Army officers who are experienced in the field of surveys, together with a number of civilian specialists. Techniques have been developed, tested and adjusted to fit the Army's problems.

The basic steps in conducting a study are as follows:

1. The questionnaire is prepared in consultation with the War Department branches, or the theater command immediately concerned. Questions are carefully chosen to provide the exact type of information desired.

2. The questionnaire is pre-tested. That is, the questions are tried out on small groups of men to determine whether they are meaningful and understandable to the type of men or officers to be studied.

3. The project is cleared for action with the commands in which the study is to be made.

4. The number of men to be surveyed is set sufficiently large to insure statistically reliable findings.

5. The men to be surveyed are selected to insure as true a cross section of the group to be studied as possible. A cross section of enlisted men in the United States, for example, is so drawn as to give proper proportionate representation to each branch of the Army, to men in each stage of training, and to men stationed in the various sections of the country. It is, of course, possible to get cross sections of a single branch, of a division, of Negro troops, or any other portion of the Army desired.

6. The men complete questionnaires under conditions of absolute anonymity. They are assembled in small groups, and hear a short introduction given by a specially trained class leader. This introduction makes it clear to the men that only their frank opinion is wanted, and that they are not being tested or spied on. No names or serial numbers are placed on the questionnaires. Ordinarily, illiterates or men of very low intelligence are interviewed by specially trained enlisted men.

7. The data are analyzed by specialists in attitude research analysis. Reports of these analysts are released to agencies concerned, and also form the basis for the material presented in this bulletin.

The procedure outlined above is that followed in the typical cross section survey. Other techniques, of course, are employed from time to time in special situations.